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INTRODUCTION 
He wears an Omega watch,1 drives an Aston Martin car,2 drinks 
Smirnoff vodka,3 and toasts with Bollinger Champagne.  As the image 
of the suave James Bond comes to mind, consider:  are James Bond 
films purely entertainment, or are they another form of commercial 
advertisement?4  These films show just one example of how our 
modern media environment blurs the line between commercial 
advertisements and entertainment works.5 
Technological advancements in media and the rise of product 
placement advertising6 make it nearly impossible to determine 
whether media producers are feeding us information for advertising 
                                        
 1. See Derrick Daye & Brad VanAuken, James Bond Brand Shaken By Product 
Placement, BRANDING STRATEGY INSIDER, Oct. 23, 2008, http://www.branding 
strategyinsider.com/2008/10/james-bond-shak.html (noting that James Bond  
“has been wearing an Omega watch since 1995’s Goldeneye, when the brand started 
paying for product placement”). 
 2. See id. (explaining that consumers link the James Bond character to Aston 
Martin automobiles). 
 3. See Lacey Rose, James Bond:  Licensed to Sell, FORBES.COM, Nov. 16, 2006, 
http://www.forbes.com/2006/11/16/bond-movie-advertising-tech-media-cx_lr_ 
1116bond.html (pointing out that Smirnoff vodka is just one of many product 
placement advertisements associated with the James Bond films). 
 4. See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT  
§ 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(11) (rev. ed., 2009) (attempting to distinguish 
works that are commercial from works that are “entertainment works used for their 
own sake”). 
 5. See Rose, supra note 3 (explaining that Sony’s focus on highlighting a few key 
products throughout the James Bond film, Casino Royale, “reflects a larger trend in 
Hollywood” to find increasingly more creative ways to promote products in their 
entertainment works); see also id. (highlighting that companies were likely to spend 
3.07 billion dollars in paid placement advertising in 2006, which was up thirty-nine 
percent from 2005). 
 6. See Stephanie Clifford, Bravo Shows Move Further Into Licensing Products,  
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2009, at B3 (revealing that Bravo will increase the amount of 
products it includes in its shows and will begin to receive a percentage of the sales of 
those products). 
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purposes or creative expression for our thoughtful consideration.7  
Despite this difficulty, the ability to separate entertainment from 
commercial advertising is a critical element in a recently proposed 
solution to a long-standing dilemma in copyright law8 put forth by 
copyright expert David Nimmer.9 
Nimmer relies on this entertainment and commercial distinction 
in his framework for deciding when a federal copyright claim should 
preempt10 a competing state right of publicity claim.11  Right of 
publicity laws allow celebrities to retain a property interest in the 
commercial use of their personalities, an interest that can conflict 
with the rights of copyright owners.12  However, as the James Bond 
films demonstrate, it is increasingly difficult to determine whether a 
work is made for a commercial or entertainment purpose. 
Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has a clear standard to 
determine when a federal copyright claim should trump a state right 
of publicity claim.13  The ongoing failure to clarify preemption in 
                                        
 7. See Amit M. Schejter, Product Placement as an International Practice:  Moral, 
Legal, Regulatory and Trade Implications, 3 (Oct. 2004), http://web.si.umich.edu/ 
tprc/papers/2004/304/product%20placement%20tprc.pdf (mentioning that “[t]he 
Center for Media & Democracy calls it a ‘[f]orm of advertisement, without disclosing 
it to the receiving party’”). 
 8. See infra Part I.C (discussing David Nimmer’s proposed test for solving 
copyright preemption by categorizing copyrighted works as those used for 
entertainment purposes or those used merely for commercial advertisements). 
 9.  See, e.g., Schuyler Moore, Straightening Out Copyright Preemption, 9 UCLA ENT. 
L. REV. 201, 203 (2002) (explaining that “[t]he treatise Nimmer on Copyright is the 
bible of copyright law . . . [and] it is rare to find a decision dealing with copyright 
where that treatise is not cited.”).  David Nimmer is the son of the late Melville B. 
Nimmer who first published the Nimmer on Copyright Treatise in 1963.  Irell & 
Manella LLP, David Nimmer, http://www.irell.com/professionals-51.html (last 
visited Dec. 1, 2009).  Since 1985, David Nimmer has continued to update and revise 
the treatise created by his father.  Id. 
 10. See 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 243 (1998) (equating the term 
preempting with superseding, and explaining that the Supreme Court sets forth 
multiple tests to determine if a federal law should supersede a competing state law 
claim). 
 11. See infra Part I.C (outlining Nimmer’s preemption test, which asks courts to 
distinguish between commercial and entertainment uses of a copyrighted work). 
 12. See, e.g., Toney v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 406 F.3d 905, 907 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(weighing the right of a celebrity to control the use of her photograph with the right 
of the copyright owner of the photo to use it on a bottle of hair care product); 
Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284, 1288 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting) (disputing the right of George Wendt to limit production of copyrighted 
animatronic figures of his Cheers character); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 
462 (9th Cir. 1988) (allowing Bette Midler’s right of publicity interest to defeat a 
copyright owner’s interest in producing a song that mimicked her voice).  
 13. See Joseph P. Bauer, Addressing the Incoherency of the Preemption Provision of the 
Copyright Act of 1976, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 2 (2007) (“[T]here are literally 
hundreds of federal and state decisions interpreting this [copyright preemption] 
provision, which can charitably be described as inconsistent and even incoherent.”). 
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copyright law threatens to undermine the uniform application of 
federal copyright law,14 and it may reduce the incentive for 
individuals to produce copyrighted works.15 
Despite the need for clarity in the copyright-preemption debate,16 
this Comment will argue that courts should not rely on Nimmer’s 
preemption framework because it does not promote the objectives of 
the Constitution or provide a consistent method to determine when a 
federal copyright claim should defeat an opposing right of publicity 
claim.  Instead, courts should incorporate elements from trademark 
law’s test for similarity to resolve copyright-preemption disputes. 
This Comment will demonstrate the problems with Nimmer’s 
framework by focusing on the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit’s decision in Facenda v. NFL Films, Inc.17  Given the 
ambiguous state of preemption in copyright law18 and the discrepancy 
across courts,19 the Third Circuit could not turn to consistent case 
precedent when it faced this duel between the state and federal 
claims.20  The court, therefore, relied primarily on Nimmer’s 
proposed solution to this preemption issue to decide if a copyright 
claim should withstand the competing state right of publicity claim.21  
                                        
 14. See id. at 23 (explaining that the Copyright Act seeks to provide uniform 
rights to all copyright owners, but the conflicting outcomes across circuit courts with 
relation to preemption claims serve to undermine this goal). 
 15. Cf. Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright Preemption and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 199, 212 (2002) (arguing that upholding right of publicity claims 
severely harms copyright holders because it undermines their ability to produce 
derivative works, which, in turn, “limits both their creative potential and their ability 
to fund their work”). 
 16. See Bauer, supra note 13, at 23 (noting that the different outcomes courts 
reach when applying the preemption doctrine is contradictory to the purpose of the 
Copyright Act). 
 17. 542 F.3d 1007 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 18. See infra Part I.A.3 (explaining how the lack of clarity within the language of 
the preemption clause of the Copyright Act leads to conflicting ideas of when state 
rights should be preempted). 
 19. See Trotter Hardy, Contracts, Copyright and Preemption in a Digital World,  
1 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2, ¶ 24 (1995), http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v1i1/hardy.html 
(pointing out that, even though the authors of the Copyright Act included the 
preemption clause in an effort to avoid any confusion as to preemption, the 
preemption doctrine “has experienced at best an inconsistent interpretation by the 
courts”). 
 20. See Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1029 (beginning the analysis of the conflict 
preemption claim by outlining Nimmer’s framework rather than relying on case 
law). 
 21. The court reasoned: 
Does a contract acknowledging a right-of-publicity for defendant’s copyright 
in a work containing a plaintiff’s identity mean that the defendant may use 
that work in any way it sees fit?  David Nimmer has proposed a two-part 
framework for handling cases at the intersection of copyright, the right of 
publicity, and contract. 
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Nimmer proposes that copyrights used for commercial advertising 
purposes, and not for pure entertainment, should not preempt a 
state right of publicity claim.22  Using Nimmer’s structure, the Third 
Circuit held that a sports broadcaster’s right of publicity claim 
trumped the National Football League’s (NFL) competing copyright 
claim because the NFL used its copyrighted film for commercial 
benefit.23 
Part I of this Comment describes the development of federal 
copyright law and state right of publicity laws and further explains the 
failed attempt of the federal preemption clause to provide a clear 
standard for copyright preemption.  It then discusses Nimmer’s 
solution to this ambiguous area of the law.  Part II examines the goals 
of the Federal Copyright Act, federalism, and First Amendment law 
to argue that Nimmer’s test both fails to fulfill these goals and is 
difficult to apply to preemption disputes in our modern media-
saturated society.  Finally, Part III proposes a more pragmatic 
solution to resolve preemption issues by adopting a test for similarity 
from trademark law.  This Comment concludes that copyright-
preemption disputes can be resolved by considering the consumer’s 
perspective on the reasonable expectations of celebrities and 
copyright owners. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Development of Copyright Preemption 
The conflict that arises between a right of publicity claim and a 
copyright claim stems from a larger debate about the balance 
between state and federal powers.24  This section explains the 
fundamental tension between the state and federal legislatures in the 
specific area of copyright law.  Examining the development of federal 
copyright protection and state right of publicity laws helps explain 
                                        
Id. 
 22. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(10)–
(11), (14)–(15) (explaining that there should not be any issue of conflict 
preemption if the courts simply distinguish between utilizations that are commercial 
or “for the purposes of trade,” and those uses that are entertainment, and therefore, 
part of the exclusive rights of copyright owners). 
 23. See Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1030 (deciding that the 22-minute NFL film was 
promotional in nature and “akin to advertising,” and therefore concluding that 
preemption was inappropriate according to Nimmer’s framework). 
 24. See Rothman, supra note 15, at 204 (noting that “[t]he right of publicity 
conflicts . . . with explicit provisions of the Copyright Act”). 
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this preemption debate and reveals why the preemption dispute in 
Facenda prompted the Third Circuit to rely on Nimmer’s framework. 
1. The creation of a federal copyright system 
The Federal Copyright Act of 1976 (Copyright Act)25 grants authors 
copyright protection for their works in order to incentivize the 
production of new creative works.26  The goal of the Copyright Act is 
to promote public knowledge and awareness by increasing the 
production of “original works of authorship”27 available for the 
public’s consideration.28  Such “original works of authorship”29 
include a wide range of media, such as movies, literature, 
architecture, television shows, and sound recordings.30 
However, Congress recognized the need to provide some reward to 
creators, authors, and producers in exchange for their investment in 
order to encourage individuals to spend time and money producing 
original works for public access.31  Therefore, the Copyright Act 
                                        
 25. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (1976) (amending the first Federal Copyright Act 
enacted in 1790). 
 26. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) 
(opining that the goal of copyright law is not to merely reward authors for their 
labor, but rather “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” (quoting 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)). 
 27. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with 
this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, 
now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”). 
 28. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (noting that the purpose of creating a federal 
system of copyright and patent law was “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”). 
 29. 17 U.S.C. § 102; see also Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (explaining that, in order for a 
work of authorship to qualify as original, it must be “independently created by the 
author . . . [and] possess[] at least some minimal degree of creativity”). 
 30. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (setting forth eight categories of works that are 
considered the subject matter of copyright:  (1) literary works, (2) musical works,  
(3) dramatic works, (4) pantomimes and choreography, (5) pictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural works, (6) motion pictures and audiovisual works, (7) sound recordings, 
and (8) architectural works). 
 31. See Bauer, supra note 13, at 11 (explaining that “[a] principal reason for 
affording copyright protection” is to encourage the creation of original works of 
authorship); Rothman, supra note 15, at 204 (explaining that copyright “strive[s] to 
protect creative artists and to provide incentives for them to create”).  The 
Association of Research Libraries notes that: 
[T]he law was meant to provide an incentive to authors, artists, and scientists 
to create original works by providing creators with a monopoly.  At the same 
time, the monopoly was limited in order to stimulate creativity and the 
advancement of science and the useful arts through wide public access to 
works in the public domain. 
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grants copyright owners exclusive rights in their copyrighted works.32  
These exclusive rights allow the copyright holder to control the 
current and future uses of the work.33  This control creates a system of 
economic rewards for copyright owners because they can charge 
others for access to, and use of, the work.34  Examples of economic 
benefit include:  licensing fees for radio stations, ticket sales to 
theatrical productions, and purchases of film scripts.35  Thus, the 
Copyright Act maintains an economic framework that rewards the 
copyright owner and the public.36 
Not only does the copyright owner have incentives to share the 
original work with the public, but the Copyright Act also provides 
incentives for the creation of derivative works,37 which are based upon 
the original copyrighted work.38  Derivative works may qualify for 
their own copyright protection,39 and in such cases the copyright 
                                        
Association of Research Libraries, Copyright Timeline:  A History of Copyright in the 
United States (2007), http://www.arl.org/pp/ppcopyright/copyresources/ 
copytimeline.shtml (internal quotations omitted). 
 32. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (granting exclusive rights to copyright owners for a 
limited time, such as the right to display, perform, distribute, reproduce, and 
prepare derivative works of the original copyrighted work). 
 33. See, e.g., Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 302 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(asserting that the copyright holder has the right to control and produce derivative 
works).  In that case, the owners of the copyright in the Wizard of Oz character, 
Dorothy, could maintain an action for copyright infringement if the plaintiff did not 
authorize the defendant’s production of plates painted with the image of Dorothy.  
Id. at 303. 
 34. See Rothman, supra note 15, at 204 (explaining that one rationale for 
copyright protection is that it combines artistic and economic values, including the 
right to license the work, convey it to others, and gain remedies against others who 
inappropriately use the work without consent of the copyright owner); see also Hardy, 
supra note 19, ¶ 5 (asserting that copyright owners can only make a profit from their 
work if they can be assured that only a minimal amount of copying of their works will 
occur if they release them to the public domain). 
 35. Cf. Christian Copyright Licensing International, The Church Copyright 
License Annual Fee-U.S., http://www.ccli.com/WhatWeOffer/LicenseFees.aspx  
(last visited Dec. 1, 2009) (listing the various fees that are charged to churches for 
access to the copyrighted sermons available for broadcast). 
 36. See Robert A. Kreiss, Accessibility and Commercialization in Copyright Theory,  
43 UCLA L. REV. 1, 14 (1995) (“The copyright system seeks to promote the public 
benefit of advancing knowledge and learning by means of an incentive system . . . 
[and t]he economic rewards of the marketplace are offered to authors in order to 
stimulate them to produce and disseminate new works.”). 
 37. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (providing the copyright owner with the exclusive 
right “to prepare derivative works based upon the [original] copyrighted work”). 
 38. See id. (defining a derivative work as “a work based upon one or more 
preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, 
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, 
abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, 
transformed, or adapted”). 
 39. See Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 909 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(clarifying that the original aspects of a derivative work can receive copyright 
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owner maintains exclusive rights over the derivative and the original 
work.40  This exclusive control over the production of derivative works 
serves as an additional economic incentive for copyright owners to 
create new works.41 
To keep pace with technological advancements,42 courts have 
broadened the scope of works that qualify for copyright protection.43  
For example, computer software,44 videogames,45 and movie clips46 are 
eligible to receive copyright protection.  Copyright protection 
extends to works that incorporate a high degree of technological 
processes, and the exclusive rights granted to authors are far-
reaching.47  The applicability of copyright law to a very broad range of 
                                        
protection, but only if the originality is “more than trivial,” and the derivative work 
does not infringe on the scope of the exclusive copyrights in the original work). 
 40. See Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 302 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting that a 
derivative work may qualify for copyright protection; however, it must have sufficient 
creativity and be based on a copyrightable work, and only the new creative aspects in 
the derivative work may be copyrighted).  In that case, the defendant’s paintings of 
the Dorothy character from the Wizard of Oz were not sufficiently independently 
creative to qualify for their own copyright protection.  Id. at 305. 
 41. See Rothman, supra note 15, at 210 (arguing that, because derivative works are 
a “major source of income” for copyright owners, the right to prepare derivative 
works is a “vital element in encouraging the production of new work”). 
 42.  The House Report on the general subject matter of copyright explained 
that: 
[T]he history of copyright law has been one of gradual expansion in the 
types of works accorded protection . . . [and] scientific discoveries and 
technological developments have made possible new forms of creative 
expression that never existed before. . . . Authors are continually finding new 
ways of expressing themselves, but it is impossible to foresee the forms that 
these new expressive methods will take. 
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664. 
 43. See Association of Research Libraries, supra note 31 (stating that the 
Copyright Act was revised in 1976 due to the changes in technology that affected how 
works could be copied and “what constituted an infringement”). 
 44. See Apple Computer, Inc., v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 
(3d Cir. 1983) (considering a computer program a type of “literary work” that should 
therefore receive protection under the Copyright Act of 1976). 
 45. See M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 435–36 (4th Cir. 1986) 
(expressly disagreeing with the lower court by holding that a video game based upon 
a copyrighted blackjack card game was within the subject matter of copyright—in the 
form of an audiovisual work—because of the creative expression that goes into 
creating the shape, sounds, format, and layout of the game). 
 46. See Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc. 342 F.3d 191, 194, 
207 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that Disney had an exclusive right to manage the clips 
from portions of its movies, and thus could prevent Video Pipeline from streaming 
segments of these movie clips online). 
 47. See generally Grant Gross, IP conference:  Copyright Has Gone Too Far, THE 
REGISTER, Nov. 16, 2001, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/11/16/ip_conference_ 
copyright_law_has/ (discussing how the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) 
gives a handful of media companies “an enormous additional amount of control” 
because it allows for copyright owners to impose digital rights management 
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creative works means that copyright holders have a long chain of 
economic reward and control.48 
Although this incentive system in copyright law is not unique to the 
United States,49 it deviates from some European countries in how 
much protection it affords to authors of a work.50  In some European 
countries, the author is the only person that can originally own the 
copyright in the work, and the author maintains a right to receive 
royalties for any future uses of the tangible work.51  However, in the 
United States, the copyright owner can be distinct from the author of 
the work.52  In copyrighted works for hire or collaborative works, the 
individual author does not necessarily own the copyright for the 
entire work.53  Furthermore, the owner can sell the copyright in the 
work separately from the tangible work.54  As such, the copyright 
holder may have the power to control the fate of a work that derives 
from another author.55  This distinction between artist and copyright 
                                        
techniques and provides that copyright infringers might also be sentenced to jail 
time for hacking into protected internet web pages). 
 48. See, e.g., Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 301 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(allowing the copyright holders of the Wizard of Oz to sue for infringement when 
replicas of its characters were painted on a series of plates); see also Brett 
Barrouquore, Seuss Lawyers Stop Holiday Who-ville in Louisville, SFGATE, Nov. 25, 2008, 
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2008/11/25/national/ 
a063325S99.DTL (granting the copyright owners of Dr. Seuss’s “Who-ville” 
characters an injunction against the city of Louisville to prevent the city from using 
the Seuss characters in a Christmas parade). 
 49. See, e.g., Association of Research Libraries, supra note 31 (mentioning that the 
federal system of copyright law in the United States is modeled after Great Britain’s 
copyright system). 
 50. See generally Open Access to Scholarly Information:  Copyright, http://open-
access.net/de_en/general_information/legal_issues/copyright/ (last visited Dec. 1, 
2009) (explaining the differences between the American legal framework and that 
employed by Germany). 
 51. See id. (detailing that, in Germany, copyright ownership vests with the author 
and seeks to protect “the economic and moral interests of the author”); see also  
2 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 4, § 8C.04[A][1] (explaining that the copyright 
laws of France and other European countries recognize a right called droit de suite, 
which “is the right of an artist to 'follow' or participate in the proceeds realized from 
the resale of the tangible embodiment of her work”). 
 52. See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2006) (clarifying that “[o]wnership of a copyright, or of 
any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any 
material object in which the work is embodied”). 
 53. See, e.g., Recording Artist’s Project at Harvard Law School, Copyright Basics, 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rap/copyright (last visited Dec. 1, 2009) (warning 
artists that in a work for hire, the creator “owns nothing”). 
 54. See 17 U.S.C § 202 (explaining that transfer of ownership of the material work 
does not mean a transfer of ownership of the copyright—they are separate and 
distinct). 
 55. See, e.g., Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1144–45 (9th Cir. 
2006) (deciding that Sony owned the copyright to the song in which the artist sang, 
and thus Sony could use segments of the song in future sound recordings). 
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owner is important to keep in mind when discussing the right to 
control the distribution of copyrighted works. 
2. The rise of state right of publicity laws 
Despite this broad federal copyright system,56 copyright owners do 
not maintain a monopoly over the use of their works.57  Various legal 
claims, such as the fair use doctrine in copyright58 and the application 
of state laws,59 limit the ability of copyright owners to have absolute 
control over the use of their creative expressions.60  In particular, the 
court-developed right of publicity doctrine limits, and arguably 
conflicts with, copyright owners’ ability to fully exercise their 
exclusive rights.61 
A right of publicity, now codified in many states,62 allows an 
individual to protect against the unauthorized commercial use of his 
                                        
 56. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5664 (recognizing that the coverage of subject matter of copyright in the current 
federal copyright statute is very broad and may be further broadened). 
 57. See Hardy, supra note 19, ¶ 5 (“Protection does not have to be, and will never 
be, absolute.  That is, once a work of authorship is released to the public, as a 
practical matter some uncontrolled copying is possible and even likely.”). 
 58. The fair use doctrine states that: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a 
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or 
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes 
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple 
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of 
copyright. 
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 59. See, e.g., Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 
2d 552, 568–69 (D. N.J. 2002) (holding the exclusive rights to creative expression 
afforded by federal copyright law did not  preempt the defendant’s state law 
conversion and replevin claims seeking the return of tangible property). 
 60. See Bauer, supra note 13, at 46–88 (discussing how state law breach of contract 
claims, unjust enrichment claims, and right of publicity claims are not necessarily 
preempted by a competing federal copyright claim). 
 61. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868  
(2d Cir. 1953) (creating the term “right of publicity” in the opinion written by Judge 
Jerome Frank); see also Joseph R. Grodin, Note, The Right of Publicity:  A Doctrinal 
Innovation, 62 YALE L.J. 1123, 1126–28 (1953) (explaining that the right of publicity, 
developed in the Haelan case, offers celebrities an additional remedy beyond breach 
of contract and tort in order to protect the commercial benefit of their personas). 
 62. See Cornell University Law School Legal Information Institute:  Publicity, 
http://topics.law.cornell.edu/wex/Publicity (last visited Dec. 1, 2009) (noting that 
only around half the states have right of publicity statutes); see also Landham v. Lewis 
Galoob Toys, Inc. 227 F.3d 619, 622 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that “[t]he right of 
publicity is a creature of state common law and statute and originated as part of the 
common-law right of privacy”). 
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or her identity.63  This right of publicity derives from an individual’s 
right of privacy in tort law.64  However, as Judge Jerome Frank opined 
in 1953,65 the right of publicity is separate and distinct from the right 
of privacy because the publicity right concerns the public exposure of 
an individual’s identity for commercial benefit.66  Today, this state 
right is similar to an intellectual property right because it details a 
right of control over an identity.67  This state right is primarily 
claimed by celebrities to prevent the unauthorized use of their 
images for advertising purposes.68  This Comment will refer to the 
right of publicity claimant as the “celebrity” because the individual 
must be an actor, singer, or other type of well-known entertainment 
figure.69 
The goal of the right of publicity is to prevent another person from 
benefitting from the unauthorized use of a celebrity’s identity.70   
An infringement of this right is distinct from a false advertising claim 
arising under trademark law because it does not require that the 
                                        
 63. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8316 (West 2007) (allowing any person 
whose “name or likeness has commercial value” to bring an action to prevent the 
unauthorized commercial use of such name or likeness). 
 64. See, e.g., James Chadwick & Roxana Vatanparast, The Copyright Act’s Preemption 
of Right of Publicity Claims, 25 COMM. LAW. 3, 3 (2008) (mentioning that the law was 
“historically treated as a species of the tort of invasion of privacy”). 
 65. See Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868 (announcing for the first time a right of publicity 
that is separate from a right of privacy). 
 66. See Grodin, supra note 61, at 1127 (“[Haelan] gave protection to persons’ 
commercial interest in their personality [sic] independent of their privacy interest.  
[I]n so doing, Haelan implied that such commercial interest, aside from any privacy 
interest, might justify legal protection of an individual against unauthorized use of 
his name or picture.”). 
 67. See Chadwick & Vatanparast, supra note 64, at 3 (“[Right of publicity] claims 
are now generally recognized as involving a form of intellectual property, particularly 
in connection with celebrities who assert not a ‘right to be left alone,’ but rather the 
right to control and profit from the use of their names and images.”). 
 68. See Lee Goldman, Elvis Is Alive, But He Shouldn’t Be:  The Right of Publicity 
Revisited, 1992 BYU L. REV. 597, 597 (1992) (“The most common invocation of [the 
right of publicity] occurs when a third party appropriates a celebrity’s name or 
likeness for endorsement purposes, for the sale of memorabilia, or in connection 
with artistic or literary works.”). 
 69. See Grodin, supra note 61, at 1127 (noting that this right was developed 
particularly for famous persons due to the need to protect the monetary interest in 
their personalities). 
 70. The Supreme Court noted in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.: 
The rationale for protecting the right of publicity is the straightforward one 
of preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of good will . . . [and] no social 
purpose is served by having the defendant get free some aspect of the 
plaintiff that would have market value and for which he would normally pay. 
433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (quoting Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren 
and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 331 (1966)). 
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celebrity be falsely associated with a commercial product.71  Instead, 
the right of publicity is concerned with any use of a celebrity’s 
identity, and it seeks to prevent others from unjustly benefitting from 
the use of that identity.72  In 1977, the Supreme Court recognized this 
right of publicity in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.73 by 
allowing a “human cannonball” performer to recover damages from a 
broadcasting company after the company videotaped the performer’s 
entire act without authorization.74  In addition to protecting the 
celebrities’ identities from unauthorized use, the Court also noted 
other justifications for this state right, including the need to 
encourage celebrities to invest time and money to make their 
performances interesting to the public.75 
Courts’ willingness to uphold a right of publicity claim is on the 
rise.76  These claims do not necessarily require that any tangible 
aspect of the celebrity’s identity was misused;77 simply conjuring up 
the celebrity’s identity may be enough to infringe a celebrity’s right 
of publicity.78  The Ninth Circuit went so far as to uphold Vanna 
                                        
 71. See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 460 (6th Cir. 2003) (explaining 
that, unlike a claim for false advertising under trademark law, a right of publicity 
claim does not require evidence that a consumer is likely to be confused); see also 1 J. 
THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 5:19, at 437 (2d ed. 
2009) (pointing out that a false endorsement claim requires a false inference that 
the plaintiff approves of the product). 
 72. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573–75 (explaining that a celebrity should have the 
right to benefit from his creative work, and another should not be able to share the 
performance with the public while denying the celebrity’s right to commercial 
benefit). 
 73. 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
 74. See id. at 563–64 (noting that the length of the entire clip was fifteen 
seconds). 
 75. See id. at 576 (highlighting that “the protection provides an economic 
incentive for him to make the investment required to produce a performance of 
interest to the public”). 
 76. See Rothman, supra note 15, at 204–05 (mentioning that conflicts between 
copyright and right of publicity claims are on the rise because “right of publicity 
actions have proliferated and the right has expanded to cover ‘persona’”). 
 77. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am. Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(clarifying that a right of publicity claim does not require actual use of the 
individual’s name, image, or likeness, but instead whether the facts taken together as 
a whole are sufficient to suggest the capture of the individual’s identity). 
 78. See, e.g., Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 811 (9th Cir. 1997) (reversing 
and remanding a grant of summary judgment because issues of material fact existed 
as to whether the defendant’s creation of animatronic characters of Wendt, based 
upon his character in the television show Cheers, violated his right of publicity);  
see also White, 971 F.2d at 1399 (ruling that a robot character wearing a long gown, 
blonde wig, and large jewelry and turning a wheel similar to that in Wheel of Fortune in 
a commercial advertisement sufficiently conjured up White’s persona to raise issues 
of fact on whether her right of publicity was infringed, thereby making summary 
judgment inappropriate). 
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White’s right of publicity claim against Samsung Electronics when 
Samsung’s commercial included a robotic character that spun a 
wheel and wore a blonde wig.79  With the strengthening of this right, 
celebrities now have some say in the fate of the works in which their 
personalities are captured, even if a copyright in the work is owned by 
another.  Thus, the copyright owner’s traditional power to control 
the original use, future use, and licenses of a copyrighted work is now 
sliding into the grip of the individual celebrity.80  Where the celebrity 
and the copyright owner have different agendas and expectations for 
the copyrighted work, courts look to the purposes and interests 
served by the federal and state laws to decide which claim to uphold.81 
3. Preemption debate in copyright law 
Although the state right of publicity serves a valid purpose in 
protecting a celebrity from commercial exploitation, the execution of 
the right often conflicts with a copyright owner’s attempt to exercise 
the exclusive rights afforded by the Copyright Act.82  This conflict 
usually arises when a copyright owner holds a valid copyright in a 
work that captures the celebrity’s identity, and the owner uses the 
copyrighted work in a way that the celebrity does not approve.83  This 
process includes the distribution of the copyright, the performance 
                                        
 79. See White, 971 F.2d at 1397–99 (rejecting White’s right of publicity claim 
based upon a California statute, but allowing a common law right of publicity claim 
to proceed). 
 80.  Cf. Goldman, supra note 68, at 600–01 (noting that prior to widespread court 
recognition of a right of publicity in Zacchini, the only claim available for celebrities 
was a right of privacy under tort law, which did not always apply in disputes related to 
copyrighted works). 
 81. See, e.g., White, 971 F.2d at 1398–99 (noting that the right of publicity was 
created to provide celebrities with an interest in the commercial use of their 
identities, and applying this interest to demonstrate that Vanna White deserved the 
right to enjoin Samsung from using her persona in a commercial advertisement for 
the company’s products); see also Midler v. Ford, 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(opining that the unauthorized use in a song of a voice that sounded just like Bette 
Midler’s was an attempt to circumvent the proper value that “the market would have 
paid for Midler to have sung the commercial in person”). 
 82. One commentator argued that: 
Both copyright and the right of publicity strive to protect creative artists and 
to provide incentives for them to create; however, the two rights . . . can 
come into serious conflict. . . . [because t]he right of publicity conflicts not 
only with the explicit provisions of the Copyright Act, but also with the 
implicit grant of affirmative rights to copyright holders and the public, as 
well as the purposes behind the copyright protection. 
Rothman, supra note 15, at 204. 
 83. See Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 
677 (7th Cir. 1986) (deciding that a baseball player could not rely on a right of 
publicity to defeat the Major League Baseball’s (MLB) exclusive right to broadcast 
the baseball games for which they owned a copyright). 
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of the copyrighted work,84 and the preparation of derivative works 
that use segments of the original work.85 
The conflict often arises when the celebrity contracts to the use of 
his or her identity in the original work, but does not agree to have the 
identity captured in derivative works.86  The conflict is especially 
problematic because the Copyright Act expressly grants the right to 
prepare derivative works to the copyright holder.87  Thus, the 
Copyright Act forces various courts to decide which claim should 
triumph:  the celebrity’s state right of publicity or the copyright 
owner’s federal rights.88 
Any conflict between a state law and a federal law inherently 
invokes the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.89  In an effort to 
uphold the Supremacy Clause, the Copyright Act includes a 
preemption clause in section 301.90  Section 301 explains that the 
                                        
 84. See id. (deciding that the players’ right of publicity in their performances was 
equivalent to the MLB’s exclusive right to perform the work when the MLB 
broadcasts the players’ baseball performances). 
 85. See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 1992) (deciding 
that Tom Waits, a professional singer, songwriter, and actor, could prevent Frito-Lay 
from imitating and then broadcasting a commercial for Frito-Lay based on Frito-
Lay’s authorized license in the original sound recording of Waits’s voice). 
 86. See, e.g., Toney v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 406 F.3d 905, 907 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(summarizing that Toney was a model who contractually agreed to authorize the use 
of her image and likeness to the Johnson hair company between 1995–1998, but 
sued under a right of publicity claim when Johnson attempted to use Toney’s image 
to promote L’Oreal products that were not explicitly agreed to and fell beyond the 
contractual time period). 
 87. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2006) (“[T]he owner of [a] copyright . . . has the 
exclusive right to do and to authorize . . . [the] prepar[ation of] derivative works 
based on the copyrighted work.”). 
 88. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2006) (noting that any legal or equitable rights that are 
the equivalent to those offered in the Copyright Act shall be preempted, but failing 
to clarify exactly which state rights should be considered an equivalent, as opposed to 
a superior, right). 
 89. See U.S. CONST. art. VI., § 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall 
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”); see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 24 (1824) (holding that, 
when Congress legislates within its powers, conflicting state laws must give way to the 
federal law). 
 90. The statute provides that: 
On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent 
to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as 
specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as 
specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created before or after that date 
and whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title.  
Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any 
such work under the common law or statutes of any State. 
17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2006); see also 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B], at 1-7 
(arguing that “courts grappling with the tension between federal and state law may 
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federal Copyright Act will preempt any state laws that offer rights 
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights in the Copyright Act.91  The 
goal of section 301 is to foreclose any misinterpretation between state 
and federal law.92 
However, the preemption clause does not resolve all conflicts 
between a state right of publicity claim and a federal copyright 
claim.93  Because state right of publicity claims do not afford rights 
that are precisely equivalent to those in the Copyright Act,94 they are 
not expressly preempted by the Copyright Act.95  Therefore, a 
problem arises in determining when a court should still preempt 
these state-law claims because they conflict with the overall goals of 
the Copyright Act.96  Under the theory of conflict preemption,97 a 
court may invalidate a state law that is “an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”98  Thus, when faced with a potential conflict between 
federal and state law, courts look to whether a statute expressly 
preempts state law and whether conflict preemption is present.99 
                                        
apply various tests to determine whether the Supremacy Clause requires pre-emption 
of state law”). 
 91. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a). 
 92. See Bauer, supra note 13, at 1–2 (quoting the legislative history of section 301 
for the proposition that the preemption provision was “set forth in the clearest and 
most unequivocal language possible, so as to foreclose any conceivable 
misinterpretation . . . and to avoid the development of any vague borderline between 
State and Federal protection.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 93. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][1][c], at 1-30 to 1-31 
(clarifying that because the subject of a right of publicity claim is the claimant’s 
persona, which does not fall within the scope of the Copyright Act, the Act’s 
preemption clause does not resolve a conflict between state and federal law because 
it does not apply). 
 94. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8316 (West 2007) (allowing an individual to 
prevent the unauthorized “commercial” use of a name or likeness, which is not the 
equivalent of any of the exclusive rights offered in the Copyright Act). 
 95. See, e.g., Facenda v. NFL Films, 542 F.3d 1007, 1027 (3d Cir. 2008) (opining 
that the Pennsylvania right of publicity statute was not expressly preempted because 
Facenda’s voice itself was not within the subject matter of copyright and the statute 
did not offer a right equivalent to those listed in the Copyright Act); see also 1 NIMMER 
& NIMMER, supra note 4, §1.01[B][3][a], at 1-77 (explaining that the Supreme Court 
has clarified that the existence of an express preemption clause does not mean that 
preemption is limited to express preemption cases; it may also arise under general 
conflict preemption, in which the state statute conflicts with the general goals of the 
federal law). 
 96. See supra Part I.A.1 (discussing the history and goals of the Copyright Act). 
 97. See Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1028 (noting that this conflict preemption may be 
referred to as “implied preemption”). 
 98. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
 99. See Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288 (1995) (opining that the 
existence of an express preemption clause in a federal statute “does not mean that 
the express clause entirely forecloses any possibility of implied pre-emption”).  The 
Supreme Court has traditionally distinguished between express preemption and 
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Unfortunately, the language of the preemption clause combined 
with legislative history creates a challenge for courts faced with 
conflict preemption in copyright.100  In the original version of section 
301, Congress explicitly listed the state laws that the Copyright Act 
would not preempt;101 however, for unclear reasons, Congress 
decided to eliminate the clear list in the final version of the statute.102  
Some courts have reasoned that the deletion of this specific list 
means that Congress believed that the Copyright Act should never 
preempt certain state rights, including the right of publicity, while 
other courts have looked to other areas of the law to interpret section 
301.103  Lacking examples of the types of state laws that section 301 
seeks to preempt, courts have applied the preemption clause with 
uncertainty and inconsistency.104 
Ultimately, the inclusion of a preemption clause in the Copyright 
Act far from resolves the conflict between right of publicity claims 
and copyright claims.105  The Fifth Circuit upheld an individual’s right 
of publicity claim when a copyrighted photograph of the individual 
appeared on a shampoo bottle,106 yet it preempted baseball players’ 
                                        
implied preemption, understanding that cases in which a state law presents an actual 
conflict with federal law as an instance of “implied preemption.”  Id. at 288–89. 
 100. See Rothman, supra note 15, at 232–35 (describing how the language of the 
preemption clause and the legislative history in its enactment have confused courts 
when attempting to resolve preemption issues). 
 101. The original draft of section 301 explicitly stated that the Copyright Law 
would not preempt 
any state [law] with respect to . . . activities violating legal or equitable rights 
that are not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope 
of copyright as specified by Section 106, including rights against 
misappropriation not equivalent to any of such exclusive rights, breaches of 
contract, breaches of trust, trespass, conversion, invasion of privacy, 
defamation, and deceptive trade practices such as passing off and false 
representation. 
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 24 (1976) reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5746. 
 102. See Rothman, supra note 15, at 234–35 (arguing that “the deletion of 
language from the final version of the statute further confuses courts as to Congress’ 
intent” and that “[t]here is a debate over why this language was deleted”). 
 103. See id. at 235 (noting that some courts and scholars have found the legislative 
history of section 301 to be inconclusive, while others have argued that Congress 
deleted the language to “prove that the right of publicity can never be preempted”). 
 104. See generally Hardy, supra note 19, ¶ 24 (arguing that the preemption clause 
has undergone an “inconsistent” interpretation at best). 
 105. See Bauer, supra note 13, at 2 (explaining that, even though there have been 
hundreds of cases relating to copyright preemption at the circuit court level, many of 
which have conflicting outcomes, the Supreme Court has yet to hear a case to clarify 
this area of the law). 
 106. See Toney v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 406 F.3d 905, 909 (7th Cir. 2005) (allowing 
Toney to proceed on a claim of right of publicity when the defendant used her 
photo for an advertisement without her consent even though the defendant was 
lawfully entitled to use the photograph for other purposes). 
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right of publicity claim related to the copyrighted broadcast of their 
games.107  In contrast, the Ninth Circuit preempted a celebrity’s right 
of publicity claim in a photograph appearing in L.A. Weekly,108 but 
allowed a celebrity’s right of publicity to trump the copyright claim 
relating to the creation of animatronic characters of his image.109  
Even though the creation of the Copyright Act and its preemption 
provision sought to eliminate confusion and inconsistency in the 
law,110 many would agree that “it would not be an overstatement to 
describe this important provision in the Copyright Act as a ‘legislative 
failure.’”111 
B. Preemption Issue in Facenda v. NFL Films 
Given the uncertainty in this area of copyright law, the Third 
Circuit turned to Nimmer for guidance on the conflict preemption 
issue in Facenda v. NFL Films.112  The preemption claim raised in 
Facenda involved the NFL’s valid copyright interest in the sound 
recording of the voice of sports broadcaster John Facenda.113 
Facenda was a Philadelphia sports broadcaster who worked with 
the NFL for many years to produce football documentaries.114  
Specifically, Facenda worked on a session-by-session basis with the 
NFL to produce NFL films, which the NFL then advertised as 
                                        
 107. Balt. Orioles v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 667  
(7th Cir. 1986) (finding that the baseball players’ right of publicity in their 
performance was equivalent to the MLB’s right to audiovisual broadcast, rendering 
the players’ claim of a right to publicity preempted under the Copyright Act). 
 108. See Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184–85 (9th Cir. 
2001) (holding that Dustin Hoffman’s right of publicity claim was preempted by the 
First Amendment when his image was used for editorial expression and not for pure 
commercial purposes). 
 109. See Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 810 (9th Cir. 1997) (concluding 
that Wendt’s right of publicity claim was not preempted as a matter of law when 
defendant used animatronic characters to portray his likeness). 
 110. See Sears, Roebuck & Co v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 n.7 (1964) (noting 
that Congress’s intent to create uniformity can be seen in statutes where it vests 
exclusive federal jurisdiction to hear copyright cases and by the “section of the 
Copyright Act which expressly saves state protection of unpublished writings but does 
not include published writings”); see also Bauer, supra note 13, at 1 (claiming that, by 
federalizing copyright law, the Framers of the Constitution sought to “achieve 
uniformity and avoid the potential for state protection of infinite duration”). 
 111. Bauer, supra note 13, at 2; see also Moore, supra note 9, at 201 (explaining that 
“case law is in chaos on these issues [of preemption] and there is, to date, no logical, 
rational analysis to determine the answers”). 
 112. 542 F.3d 1007, 1029 (3d Cir. 2008) (turning directly to Nimmer’s framework 
when discussing the conflict preemption issue between Facenda and the NFL). 
 113. See id. at 1026 (recounting that the copyright in the sound clips of Facenda’s 
voice derived from a copyrighted production of NFL films in which Facenda 
expressly contracted to appear). 
 114. Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1012. 
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documentaries with the “[l]egendary [v]oice of John Facenda.”115  
Football fans termed Facenda “the Voice of God,”116 and Facenda 
worked with the NFL to produce films for decades.117  While most of 
his contracts with the NFL were oral,118 shortly before he died from 
cancer in 1984, Facenda signed an express contract allowing the NFL 
to enjoy the use of his film sequences “provided, however, such use 
does not constitute an endorsement of any product or service.”119 
In 2005, the NFL produced a short film entitled the “The Making 
of Madden NFL 06” (“Making of Madden”), which focused on the 
then-upcoming video game “Madden NFL 2006.”120  In addition to 
interviews with players and the video game’s producers, the film 
included sound clips of Facenda’s voice.121  While Facenda did not 
personally work on this short film, the NFL included his voice in the 
film by using segments of the old NFL copyrighted films that featured 
Facenda’s commentary.122  In 2007, Facenda’s estate sued the league 
under a false endorsement claim and for unauthorized use of his 
name or likeness under Pennsylvania’s right of publicity statute.123  
The NFL denied that this film was a commercial endorsement in 
depositions, but the Third Circuit determined that the short film was 
an infomercial designed to promote sales of the “Madden NFL 06” 
video game.124 
C. Nimmer’s Preemption Test 
Forgoing a discussion of case law,125 the Third Circuit’s discussion 
of the conflict preemption dispute in Facenda relied exclusively on 
                                        
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See id. (explaining that Facenda was paid per each program he produced). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See id. (explaining that the 22-minute film appeared on the NFL network 
eight times during the three days leading up to the video game’s release). 
 121. Id.  
 122. See id. (highlighting that the documentary included three sentences read by 
Facenda which took approximately thirteen seconds of the program). 
 123. Id. at 1011; see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8316 (West 2007) (allowing a 
claim if one’s name or likeness is used for commercial purposes without consent). 
 124. See Facenda, 524 F.3d at 1012 (noting that, even though the NFL executives 
denied the commercial purpose of the film in their depositions, the record indicated 
various email messages that suggested that “NFL Films sought to create the program 
as promotion for Madden NFL 06, describing it as the ‘Madden Promo’ or as  
‘the Advertisements’ in the actors’ release forms”). 
 125. See Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1029–32 (beginning its discussion of the state right of 
publicity claim by explaining Nimmer’s framework, rather than turning to case law).  
The court continued to discuss the framework and why Nimmer believes various 
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Nimmer’s framework.126  Nimmer developed this test as a means of 
reconciling the various court decisions dealing with copyright 
preemption of a right of publicity claim.127  Nimmer determined that 
there is a pattern that involves distinguishing between a commercial 
advertisement and an entertainment work.128  Based upon this 
pattern, Nimmer puts forth a framework that involves a two-step 
process to determine whether the right of publicity claim should 
overcome the competing copyright claim.129 
Under his test, courts should first determine whether the 
copyrighted work in dispute was used for an entertainment purpose130 
or a commercial advertising purpose.131  Nimmer directs courts to 
refrain from classifying works by their nature or medium because, 
under his test, there is no single type of work (e.g., movie, book, 
song) that will always be commercial or will always be 
entertainment.132  Rather, courts should look specifically to the use of 
                                        
circuit courts allowed a right of publicity claim to stand in some cases and why the 
claim failed in other cases.  Id. 
 126. See id. at 1030–32 (concluding that this was not an express preemption of the 
right of publicity because the Pennsylvania right of publicity statute did not have the 
same elements as a copyright claim; rather, it had an extra element requiring 
“commercial” use of the name or likeness). 
 127. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(11) 
(focusing on sixteen different “right of publicity” cases to explain his framework). 
 128. See id.  (listing cases in which a right of publicity was upheld along with those 
where it was preempted, and then determining that the former were all 
“commercial” uses of a copyright, while the later were “expressive” uses of the 
copyrighted work). 
 129. See id. § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(15) (explaining that if a work is an 
expressive use, then it should not be preempted; however, if it is a commercial use, 
then it is necessary to look to the artist’s contract to see if the artist agreed to such a 
use).  Nimmer applies this framework to Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645  
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996), to explain that because Fleet contracted to act in a commercial 
film, he could not later complain when the film was broadcast on television.   
1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(18). 
 130. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(11) 
(failing to provide a clear definition of the term “expressive” as he uses it, and 
instead merely listing several examples of works that he considers expressive, 
including a movie, a docudrama, a character in a movie, a song, and a digitized 
image). 
 131. See id. § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(10)–(11) (placing a commercial 
advertisement into the general category of a work made “for the purposes of trade”) 
(citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 (1995)).  Nimmer also 
quotes the Restatement: 
The name, likeness, and other indicia of a person’s identity are used ‘for the 
purposes of trade’ . . . if they are used in advertising the user’s goods or 
services, or are placed on merchandise marketed by the user, or are used in 
connection with services rendered by the user. 
Id. at 1-88.2(10) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 (1995)). 
 132. See id. § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(12) (demonstrating how a type of 
work, such as a film, can be “protected” as entertainment if it teaches how to dance, 
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the copyrighted work to determine whether the copyright owner used 
the work as a commercial advertisement for another product, or 
whether it was an expressive use for public entertainment.133  
Expressive uses of a copyright are likely to preempt a state right.134  
However, if a court determines that use of the copyright is for a 
commercial advertisement, it should then look to Nimmer’s second 
prong.135 
Nimmer’s second prong asks courts to look at the terms of the 
original contract to determine if the celebrity agreed to participate in 
commercial advertisements.136  Nimmer explains that if the original 
work was a commercial advertisement for a product or concept courts 
have been likely to find that the celebrity implicitly authorized the 
copyright owner to create derivative works for commercial advertising 
purposes.137  On the other hand, if the original work was completely 
unrelated to the promotion of a product or idea, courts have been 
much more willing to uphold the celebrity’s right of publicity claim.138  
For example, when a celebrity sings a song for an album, she cannot 
prevent the copyright owner from creating another album song that 
uses the copyrighted portion of her voice.139  However, where a 
                                        
“but [it is] on the wrong side if it just glorifies a computer game that the NFL wants 
to sell”). 
 133. See id. (“The distinction between those lists is not between categories, but 
between utilizations.  A song can be on the right side if used to express Jennifer 
Lopez’s artistic vision, but on the wrong if it hawks [sic] Cheetos and Cherokees.”). 
 134. See id. § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(11) (noting that cases he deemed to 
be expressive uses turned out to be the ones in which the various courts preempted 
the right of publicity claim). 
 135. See, e.g., Facenda v. NFL Films, Inc. 542 F.3d 1007, 1030 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(explaining that Nimmer directs the courts to look at the “purpose[s] of the use to 
which the plaintiff [celebrity] initially consented when signing over the copyright in 
a contract”).  
 136. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][II], at 1-88.2(16) 
(citing Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), as an example in 
which the artists agreed to participate in the commercial production of a movie in 
contract, and thus failed to get an injunction to prevent the movie company from 
distributing a movie based on a right of publicity claim). 
 137. See id. § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][II], at 1-88.2(18) (asserting that an artist who 
“sang for a recording . . . could not complain when that very recording was later 
exploited, by being used as background [for a] Jennifer Lopez [song]”). 
 138. See id. § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(11) (listing nine cases where the court 
upheld a right of publicity claim because the original copyrighted works had no 
relation to their derivative works, which were commercial advertisements for 
unrelated products, including the use of singer Tom Waits’s voice in a Doritos 
commercial and the use of Vanna White’s likeness to sell Samsung televisions). 
 139. See Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1165 (6th Cir. 
2003) (declaring that a singer’s claim regarding the sampling of a previously 
recorded song being used in a new song by a different artist was preempted by 
federal law). 
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celebrity appears in a copyrighted artistic photograph, she may be 
able to prevent the copyright owner from placing that photo on a 
shampoo bottle.140 
Through this framework, Nimmer explains the conflicting 
outcomes in sixteen different right of publicity claims.141  Of these 
sixteen cases, nine courts allowed the state claim to stand, and seven 
courts upheld the copyright owner’s claim.142  Nimmer proposes that 
when a celebrity agrees to participate in a copyrighted work knowing 
that it will be used for commercial advertisements, they should not 
later be able to deny the copyright owner the ability to exercise all of 
the exclusive federal rights, including the preparation of derivative 
works that use the celebrity’s identity. 143  On the other hand, he 
instructs that a federal copyright claim should fail to preempt a state 
right of publicity claim when the copyrighted work is created for a 
commercial purpose that the celebrity has not explicitly agreed to in 
his or her contract.144  Nimmer includes the district court’s holding in 
Facenda as an example of the latter situation.145 
While Nimmer successfully rationalizes the outcomes of various 
copyright-preemption disputes through his framework, it is important 
to consider whether his framework will assist courts in future 
preemption claims.  Therefore, this Comment will analyze (1) the 
                                        
 140. See Toney v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 406 F.3d 905, 910 (7th Cir. 2005) (denying 
that a model’s right of publicity claim was preempted by federal law when her 
photograph was used without her consent on the packaging for a hair care product). 
 141. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(11) 
(listing the various cases that he uses to advance his theory). 
 142. See id. 
 143. The court in Facenda discusses Nimmer’s analysis of Fleet by explaining: 
Fleet acted in a movie; for that reason, he could not complain when that very 
movie was later exploited, by being broadcast on television.  Laws sang for a 
recording; for that reason, she could not complain when that very recording 
was later exploited, by being used as background for Jennifer Lopez. 
Facenda v. NFL Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1031 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing 1 NIMMER & 
NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][II], at 1-88.2(18)). 
 144. See id. at 1030 (explaining that, under Nimmer’s test, “[i]f . . . the plaintiff 
did not collaborate specifically in the creation of advertising content, then the 
plaintiff is in a strong position to assert continuing control over the use of his 
image”); see also 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][II],  
at 1-88.2(18) (contrasting the failed right of publicity claim in Toney with Facenda by 
arguing that in Toney, the copyright owners did not misappropriate the use of the 
work; rather, “they simply did exactly what she agreed to,” which “stand[s] poles 
apart from the NFL” when it used Facenda’s commentary for a video game). 
 145. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][II], at 1-88.2(17) 
(“[I]n [the Facenda] case, ‘a Philadelphia television news anchorman, and the 
narrator of NFL Films’ game footage and highlight reels,’ was allowed to maintain a 
publicity claim when the NFL repurposed recordings of his voice not for a new 
entertainment product, but instead for an elaborate infomercial.” (citing Facenda v. 
NFL. Films, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 491, 493 (E.D. Pa. 2007))). 
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goals of copyright law, (2) potential preemption disputes, and (3) the 
application of Nimmer’s test in Facenda, to determine if Nimmer 
offers a viable solution to the copyright-preemption controversy.   
The following argument will detail this analysis and explain how 
Nimmer’s test ultimately fails to provide any more clarity in 
copyright-preemption disputes. 
II. NIMMER’S PREEMPTION FRAMEWORK DOES NOT PROPERLY 
PROMOTE THE GOALS OF THE STATE AND FEDERAL LEGISLATURES 
An examination of a proposed preemption framework should 
scrutinize whether courts will be able to uphold the Constitution and 
promote the goals of the legislature when applying the test to 
individual cases.146  The test should also be easily applicable and lead 
to consistent case precedent.147  Because Nimmer’s test is not easily 
applicable and does not promote constitutional objectives, courts 
should not adopt it as an acceptable solution to the copyright-
preemption debate. 
A. Three Considerations in Evaluating Nimmer’s Test 
As previously noted by legal scholars, a copyright-preemption 
framework should facilitate consistent application, protect creative 
expression, and balance the interests of state and federal 
legislatures.148 
First, the framework should promote a uniform and consistent 
method to determine the extent of a copyright owner’s exclusive 
                                        
 146. See generally Bauer, supra note 13, at 6–11 (beginning his analysis of the 
preemption doctrine in the Copyright Act by first outlining the goals of the federal 
Copyright Act and the constitutional provisions related to copyright protection); 
Kreiss, supra note 36, at 6, 9–10 (analyzing the importance of accessibility in 
copyright law by first clarifying the goals of copyright law and then testing whether 
provisions related to copyright accessibility help to achieve the goals of the Copyright 
Act). 
 147. See generally Hardy, supra note 19, ¶ 24 (explaining that one of the 
fundamental complaints about the preemption provision in the Copyright Act is that 
it is “inconsistent” and leads courts to develop different interpretations for when a 
state law should be preempted). 
 148. See generally Bauer, supra note 13, at 3, 13 (discussing the role that 
preemption should play in upholding the goals of the Copyright Act and explaining 
the importance of upholding a uniform federal copyright system under the 
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution); Goldman, supra note 68, at 616–17 (arguing 
for the protection of the freedom of expression, as guaranteed by the First 
Amendment); Rothman, supra note 15, at 240–50 (describing the importance of the 
state interest and the federal interest served by right of publicity and copyright law 
respectively, and critiquing preemption tests that do not properly balance these 
competing interests). 
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rights.149  The authors of the Copyright Act sought to create a uniform 
federal framework that would provide equal protection to copyright 
owners across all states.150  The Supreme Court explained that the 
exclusive right of federal courts to hear copyright cases reveals the 
congressional goal of a uniform system.151  In 2002, the Ninth Circuit 
again reiterated this goal in Syntek Semiconductor Co. v. Microchip 
Technology Inc.,152 noting that the “Congressional intent to have 
national uniformity in copyright laws is clear.”153  Standardizing the 
rights and benefits of copyright ownership is necessary to incentivize 
the creation of original expression,154 which is the fundamental 
purpose of copyright protection.155 
A second consideration in evaluating a preemption framework is 
whether the test properly protects the freedom of expression, 
                                        
 149. See Michael Erlinger, Jr., An Analog Solution in a Digital World:  Providing Federal 
Copyright Protection for Pre-1972 Sound Recordings, 16 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 45, 59 (2009) 
(asserting that the purpose of a unified federal system over a state system is to get rid 
of the “anachronistic, uncertain, impractical, highly complicated dual system” of 
common law copyright under state laws and federal law (quoting H.R. REP. NO.  
94-1476, at 109 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5745)). 
 150. Congress detailed the reasoning for creating a uniform system for federal 
statutory copyright: 
One of the fundamental purposes behind the copyright clause of the 
Constitution, as shown in Madison’s comments in The Federalist, was to 
promote national uniformity and to avoid the practical difficulties of 
determining and enforcing an author’s rights under the differing laws and in 
the separate courts of the various States.  
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 129 (1976); see also Viva R. Moffat, Super-Copyright:  Contracts, 
Preemption, and the Structure of Copyright Policymaking, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 45, 49 
(2007) (arguing that there is a federal goal of balance and uniformity when creating 
policies and laws related to the federal Copyright Act).  
 151. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 n.7 (1964)  
(“The purpose of Congress to have national uniformity in patent and copyright laws 
can be inferred from such statutes as that which vests exclusive jurisdiction to hear 
patent and copyright cases in federal courts . . . .”). 
 152. 307 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 153. Id. at 781. 
 154. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973) (describing the purpose 
of copyright as “to encourage people to devote themselves to intellectual and artistic 
creation” by “guarantee[ing] to authors and inventors a reward in the form of 
control over the sale or commercial use of copies of their works”); see also Dotan 
Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause:  Promotion of Progress as a Limitation 
on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 1777–79 (2006) (arguing 
that the Framers’ intent in the copyright clause was based on a theory of 
encouragement, incentives, and progress). 
 155. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8 (mandating protection for copyrights to 
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 
129 (1976) (declaring that, because “the methods for dissemination of an author’s 
work are incomparably broader and faster than they were in 1789, national 
uniformity in copyright protection is even more essential than it was then to carry 
out the constitutional intent”). 
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regardless of whether that expression has a commercial purpose.156  
Commercial speech157 is protected speech by the First Amendment.158  
While commercial speech does not necessarily receive the same level 
of protection as political speech,159 courts still offer it constitutional 
protection.160  The Supreme Court has recognized that distinguishing 
commercial speech from artistic speech can be an impossible task, 
and when in doubt, courts should err on the side of protecting the 
right to speak.161  Even Nimmer suggests that it is not always easy to 
draw a bright-line between commercial and non-commercial 
speech.162  This difficulty reveals that any preemption proposal should 
not call for a one-size-fits-all categorization of commercial and non-
commercial expression.163 
Third, a preemption solution should balance the interests served 
by federal copyright law and state right of publicity laws.164  Some 
                                        
 156. In discussing whether Congress may legislate copyright protection for facts, 
Nimmer states: 
The First Amendment, as applied to the states via the Fourteenth 
Amendment, guarantees freedom of speech and press . . . [which] surely 
limits, in some degree, the extent to which the states, as well as the federal 
government, may confer a property status upon facts, or otherwise preclude 
their free dissemination. 
1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][2][b], at 1-71. 
 157. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66–67 (1983) 
(explaining that in First Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court employs a 
three prong test to determine if a speech is commercial:  (1) is the speech an 
advertisement; (2) does the speech refer to a specific product or service; and  
(3) does the speaker have an economic motivation for the speech). 
 158. See Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(noting that commercial speech “is entitled to a measure of First Amendment 
protection”).  
 159. See id. at 1184–85 (stating that pure commercial speech is not granted the full 
extent of First Amendment protection, and further explaining that false or 
misleading commercial speech is not protected at all and may be regulated). 
 160. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 183 
(1999) (articulating that commercial speech may come within the provision of the 
First Amendment, but only if the speech is lawful, not misleading, and outweighs the 
government’s interest in regulating the speech). 
 161. See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988) 
(stating, in dicta, “we do not believe that the speech retains its commercial character 
when it is inextricably intertwined with otherwise fully protected speech”). 
 162. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(12) 
(admitting that “the line between intrinsic expression and commercial invocation 
can itself be difficult to draw at times”). 
 163. See Goldman, supra note 68, at 617 (explaining that if courts attempt to draw 
a clear line between commercial and non-commercial speech, they threaten to  
“chill expressive conduct unquestionably protected by the First Amendment”). 
 164. See Bauer, supra note 13, at 117–18 (explaining that under conflict 
preemption, a court “may also be required to balance the full range of interests and 
values of the federal and state governments in the copyright area.”); see also Chadwick 
& Vatanparast, supra note 64, at 3 (beginning their argument about preemption 
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proposed solutions to the preemption issue call for eliminating the 
right of publicity all together.165  However, a failure to recognize the 
distinct and necessary protection afforded by this state right would 
result in unfair exploitation of celebrities.166  Therefore, preemption 
frameworks that call for federal preemption in all cases are overly 
simplistic and inappropriate solutions.167  Similarly, an excessive 
limitation of federal copyright protection would hinder the creation 
of new works.168  While Nimmer’s test does not call for a sweeping 
elimination of either the state or federal right, it is still necessary to 
examine whether he properly balances the interests and goals of the 
conflicting laws. 
B. Nimmer’s Test Fails to Fulfill Constitutional Objectives Related to 
Creative Expression 
Nimmer’s framework does not adequately solve the copyright-
preemption debate because it fails to promote the goals and legal 
precedent established by copyright law, First Amendment law, and 
state publicity laws.  Moreover, the test is difficult to apply to modern 
copyrighted works, and thus will not help courts establish a clear 
standard in this area of the law.169 
1. The test conflicts with the goals of copyright law set forth in the Copyright 
 Act and the Constitution 
First, Nimmer’s proposed copyright-preemption test fails to fulfill a 
primary goal of the Copyright Act because it does not promote a 
                                        
proposals by noting the interaction between “interests protected by the right of 
publicity” and “interests protected by the Copyright Act”). 
 165. See Goldman, supra note 68, at 628 (arguing that Congress should consider 
federal legislation that would preempt a right of publicity in all copyright cases, and 
that states which do not have right of publicity laws should refrain from creating 
them). 
 166. See Rothman, supra note 15, at 245 (arguing that eliminating the right of 
publicity would be a poor solution to this issue because this state right fills a void that 
is not covered by contract law, copyright law, the law relating to unfair competition, 
the law relating to false advertising, or any other area of the law). 
 167. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 565 (1977) 
(explaining that the right of publicity ensures that celebrities are not unfairly 
exploited); see also Rothman, supra note 15, at 245 (explaining that the right of 
publicity serves an important policy goal of preventing unjust enrichment, and it 
would be inappropriate to do away with these state laws in all situations). 
 168. See supra Part I.A.1 (explaining that the ability to reap monetary benefit from 
the production of derivative works is a major incentive for copyright owners to use 
their copyrights to produce new works for public enjoyment). 
 169. See Schejter, supra note 7, at 6 (asserting that in modern media society, which 
relies on product placement to advertise, it is becoming increasingly difficult to draw 
the line between an expressive work and a commercial advertisement). 
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uniform copyright system.  In drafting the Copyright Act of 1976, the 
authors explicitly sought to avoid the inconsistent application of 
copyright protection across the states.170  Yet, under Nimmer’s 
framework, once a court determines that the work is an 
advertisement, it merely looks to the celebrity’s original contract to 
see if the celebrity explicitly agreed to a commercial use of his or her 
identity.171  However, Nimmer admits that it is not always clear 
whether a work is expressive or commercial.172  Therefore, the 
Copyright Act might govern in some jurisdictions, whereas the 
unique terms of a contract may be decisive in other jurisdictions.173 
While contracts can play an important role in copyright law,174 the 
problem in Nimmer’s test lies with the inconsistency in determining 
whether a contract or the Copyright Act should govern a preemption 
dispute.  By allowing for a potentially subjective interpretation of 
copyrighted use, Nimmer’s test offers copyright owners a different 
measure of exclusive rights depending on the particular 
jurisdiction.175 
Nimmer’s test also undermines the goals of copyright law because 
it will deter the creation of new copyrightable expression.  Copyright 
                                        
 170. See Bauer, supra note 13, at 8 (“It is noteworthy that the first argument 
proffered, which referred to James Madison’s comments in the Federalist Papers, was 
the importance of ‘promot[ing] national uniformity and . . . avoid[ing] the practical 
difficulties of determining and enforcing an author’s rights under the differing laws 
and in the separate courts of the various States.’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476,  
at 129 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5745)). 
 171. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(12) 
(“The basis of a right of publicity claim concerns the message—whether the plaintiff 
endorses, or appears to endorse the product in question.”). 
 172. See id. (acknowledging that some utilizations, particularly those of a sexual 
nature, can be perceived as both expressive and commercial). 
 173. Compare Facenda v. NFL Films, 542 F.3d 1007, 1028 (3d. Cir 2008) (deciding 
the preemption issue in favor of Facenda because his contract did not explicitly 
agree to any commercial use of his name or likeness), with Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 50 Cal. 
App. 4th 1911, 1924 (Cal. App. Ct. 1996) (looking to CBS’s interest in a copyrighted 
film to decide that Fleet could not prevent the distribution of the film based on a 
right of publicity claim). 
 174. See Hardy, supra note 19, ¶ 17 (asserting that contracts will play an 
increasingly important role in copyright disputes because the rapid pace of 
technological changes, the rise of the Internet, and attempts of copyright owners to 
place restrictions on digital infringements will prompt personal contracts “to take up 
where state-of-the-art restrictions on copying leave off”).  Hardy then argues that 
contracts play an important role in copyright law because the Copyright Act cannot 
keep pace with the rapid rise of copyright disputes related to digital media; 
therefore, individual contracts try to fill in the gap.  Id.  However, this development 
will also lead to disputes related to the copyright preemption of state contracts.   
Id. ¶ 3. 
 175. See Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284, 1288 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting) (opining that allowing individual state courts to change the extent of 
copyright protection will undermine the purpose of a uniform copyright system). 
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protection seeks to increase public access to works of authorship by 
incentivizing individuals to produce new works.176  However, 
Nimmer’s test threatens this incentive system by placing a state right 
on par with a federal copyright and making it just as likely that a state 
claim will trump a federal copyright claim.177  The Third Circuit 
warned in Facenda that an increased willingness of courts to uphold 
right of publicity claims could unfairly limit the ability of copyright 
owners to exercise their exclusive rights.178 
Furthermore, allowing a celebrity to succeed in a publicity claim 
based upon a brief appearance in a copyrighted work is likely to 
encourage litigation and make copyright owners fearful of preparing 
future derivative works.179  With the risk of potential litigation from a 
myriad of celebrities who appear in any portion of the original work, 
copyright holders are likely to limit the extent to which they use the 
original copyright to create further derivative works for public 
dissemination.180 
2. The test conflicts with First Amendment jurisprudence 
The application of First Amendment law to copyrighted expression 
reveals a second shortcoming of Nimmer’s framework:   
it inappropriately limits freedom of expression.181  Nimmer’s test 
                                        
 176. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1994) (“The immediate 
effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an author’s creative labor.  
But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the 
general public good.” (internal quotations omitted”). 
 177. Cf. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I]–[II],  
at 1-88.2(9)–(21) (declining to give more weight to the copyright claim based on its 
federal status).  Under Nimmer’s theory, if the commercial use of the copyrighted 
work was not explicit in the artist’s original contract, the state right should have the 
potential to defeat the federal right based upon contract principles.  Id. 
 178. The court noted that: 
Despite our holding, we emphasize that courts must circumscribe the right 
of publicity so that musicians, actors, and other voice artists do not get a 
right that extends beyond commercial advertisements to other works of 
artistic expression.  If courts fail to do so, then every record contract or 
movie contract would no longer suffice to authorize record companies and 
movie studios to distribute their works. 
Facenda v. NFL Films, 542 F.3d 1007, 1032 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 179. See Chadwick & Vatanparast, supra note 64, at 6 (arguing that the failure of 
courts to preempt right of publicity claims will lead to “increased litigation because 
those who use copyrighted works cannot predict the consequences of a particular 
course of conduct and adjust their conduct accordingly”). 
 180. Cf. Goldman, supra note 68, at 607 (highlighting that state right of publicity 
claims will undermine the incentive system that is established in copyright law). 
 181. Cf. id. at 616–17 (arguing that the attempt to draw a line between commercial 
and non-commercial speech in First Amendment jurisprudence is not easy and, 
“[c]onsequently, some expression that should be immune from liability goes 
unprotected”). 
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attempts to place all works with commercial elements in a category of 
copyrightable expression that merit less than the full extent of 
federal protection.182  The test requires courts to decide whether a 
work is an “expressive work promulgated for its own sake” or whether 
it is a work produced for a commercial advertising purpose.183   
Yet, the Supreme Court, as well as Nimmer, has recognized the 
difficulty in separating commercial expression from non-commercial 
expression.184  Furthermore, Nimmer fails to give a clear definition of 
a “commercial use,” and he does not present a method to distinguish 
between an entertainment and commercial use.185  While Nimmer 
rationalizes courts’ past decisions on preemption disputes by drawing 
a dichotomy between an expressive and a commercial use,186 this 
rationale will not help courts decide cases where a work may have 
both a commercial and an expressive purpose. 
3. The test fails to properly balance the interests served by the federal 
 copyright law and state publicity laws 
Finally, Nimmer’s test does not appropriately balance the strength 
of federal claims in the face of competing state claims.  While 
Nimmer’s test allows for outcomes that favor both copyright claims 
and right of publicity claims, it does not properly consider the 
competing state and federal interests.187  There are legitimate 
                                        
 182. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(11) 
(considering a video, images, photos, voice over, and a robotic cartoon that were 
used in commercial advertisements as clearly on the side of “commercial 
exploitations” rather than considering the potential that these works could also be 
“expressive works,” which should trigger preemption according to his framework). 
 183. Id. § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(15). 
 184. See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988) 
(explaining that commercial elements and artistic elements in a work are often 
intertwined, as was the case with a professional speech that was not necessarily purely 
commercial even though it related to a financial motivation); see also 1 NIMMER & 
NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(12) (admitting that  
“some utilizations straddle the line” between expressive and commercial uses of a 
copyrighted work).  But see 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], 
at 1-88.2(13) (arguing that very few cases “fall outside of this dichotomy” of 
expressive and commercial purposes). 
 185. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(11) 
(examining sixteen cases that courts have already decided and listing those cases in 
which the copyright succeeded as expressive uses of the copyright and those which 
the copyright claim failed as commercial uses; however, Nimmer does not provide a 
definition of what is an expressive work and what is a commercial work). 
 186. See id. (listing seven works that he considers commercial and then listing nine 
examples of works that he considers pure entertainment). 
 187. See id. at 1-88.2(11)–(12) (listing various cases where a right of publicity was 
both upheld and preempted, but failing to discuss the federal or state interests 
served in each of the cases). 
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interests in a state right of publicity claim,188 but the facts of each case 
should be carefully considered to determine if the individual 
celebrity’s interest should trump the public interest served by the 
federal copyright system.189  The Copyright Act is an explicit 
extension of the Constitution’s mandate to promote the development 
of science and art.190  As the Constitution is the supreme law of the 
land, there should be a strong state interest asserted before a state law 
can curtail the constitutional interests served by copyright 
protection.191  While the right of publicity’s interest in protecting an 
individual’s rights against government interests is robust in our legal 
system,192 the constitutional goal of increasing public awareness 
through the creative arts should outweigh a celebrity’s profit interest 
except in cases of obvious exploitation.193 
C. Problems Applying Nimmer’s Test to Current Media 
The application of Nimmer’s test to modern media further reveals 
the flaws in his preemption framework.  Advertisements are no 
longer purely in the form of short television commercials.194  Our era 
of TiVo, DVR, and commercial fast forwarding leaves the traditional 
                                        
 188. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 565 (1977) 
(discussing the reasoning behind the creation of the right of publicity laws, including 
a protection against unjust enrichment). 
 189. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 974 
(10th Cir. 1996) (arguing that “the inducements generated by publicity rights are 
not nearly as important as those created by copyright and patent law,” and that there 
is an even smaller incentive effect in the right of publicity when it is claimed in the 
context of parodies). 
 190. See Association of Research Libraries, supra note 31 (asserting that the 
Constitution gives Congress the power to protect copyrights, and the “First Congress 
implemented the copyright provision of the U.S. Constitution in 1790” when it 
created the first Federal Copyright Act of 1790). 
 191. See Goldman, supra note 68, at 623 (noting that, according to the Supremacy 
Clause, “state law is preempted whenever it stands as an obstacle to the objectives of 
federal law,” and that the interest afforded by the right of publicity directly conflicts 
with the interests in the Copyright Act to incentivize the creation of new or derivative 
works). 
 192. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I, XIV (explicitly listing what states shall not do 
to individuals who fall within the Constitution’s protection). 
 193. See Rothman, supra note 15, at 250 (explaining that an additional reason to 
hold in favor of the copyright owner when a contract is silent on derivative works  
“is that it is more important to provide incentives for the creation of the original 
work than for the actors to perform in the project”). 
 194. See Schejter, supra note 7, at 3 (arguing that “today’s audiences are equipped 
with enough choice and new technological advances that allow them to ignore 
advertised messages by zapping to other channels or skipping them altogether with 
the help of digital video recorders,” which sets the stage for a product placement to 
replace traditional commercial advertisements). 
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commercial advertisement less effective.195  In response to this 
technological change, cable networks and film producers increasingly 
rely on product placement to gain financial benefit from their 
entertainment works.196  The advertisement of “Tresemme” hair care 
products in Project Runway and the display of “T-Mobile Sidekick” 
phones in Bravo’s Top Chef demonstrate how entertainment works 
incorporate commercial advertisements.197  Nimmer’s proposal to 
separate commercial uses from entertainment uses is difficult to 
apply to those media works that straddle the line. 
Cable shows are not the only media outlets that clandestinely 
incorporate advertisements into entertainment.  Literary works also 
highlight the difficulty in distinguishing between expressive and 
commercial uses of a work.  For example, when an author worked 
with Bulgari Jewelry to write a detective novel about stolen Bulgari 
jewelry and subsequently sold it to bookstores,198 the work arguably 
had both a commercial and an expressive purpose.  Finally, 
subliminal advertising has recently begun to pervade broadcast 
news199 through the display of products on the news anchors’ desks.200 
The increased commingling of entertainment and commercial 
works in the media burdens the application of Nimmer’s framework.  
Nimmer fails to address how courts should resolve preemption 
                                        
 195. See id. (explaining that the ability to fast forward through traditional 
commercials has prompted cable networks to include advertising in the shows that 
they air); see also Rose, supra note 3 (asserting that “for the brands, [product 
placement] is a DVR-proof way of getting their message across and associating their 
name with an established franchise”). 
 196. See Product Placement News Staff, TiVo Product Placement, PRODUCT 
PLACEMENT NEWS, Mar. 14, 2007, http://www.productplacement.biz/2007031473/ 
News/Product-Placement/tivo-product-placement.html (revealing that TiVo has led 
to “more insidious forms of marketing,” and even sells information about its 
subscribers to marketers). 
 197. See Bravo Announces Sponsors for Project Runway Season 5, THE FUTON CRITIC,  
Jul. 14, 2008, http://www.thefutoncritic.com/news.aspx?id=20080714bravo02 (listing 
Tresemme, Bluefly, Saturn, and L’Oreal Paris as advertising sponsors whose products 
will appear throughout Project Runway). 
 198. See Richard Alan Nelson, The Bulgari Connection:  A Novel Form of Product 
Placement, 10 J. PROMOTION MANAGEMENT 203, 203 (2004), available at 
http://www.haworthpress.com/store/ArticleAbstract.asp?sid=CH4DRNNF1P819PC4
Q3HK3K8S3CVS6AV1&ID=45825 (explaining that the jewelry store worked with an 
author to create a novel, which featured the Bulgari products). 
 199. See, e.g., Abigail Goldman, Eye-Opener with a Pitch, LAS VEGAS SUN, July 21, 
2008, at 1 (explaining that news stations in Chicago, Seattle, New York and Las Vegas 
have been known to use product placement in their broadcasts, and journalism 
trainers worry that this practice could lead to a slippery slope in which advertising 
companies begin to control news coverage). 
 200. See id. (reporting that “[t]he anchors aren’t even supposed to acknowledge 
[the coffee drinks] . . . [so] . . . [t]hey get into your mind without you knowing it”). 
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disputes when a copyrighted work incorporates an entertainment use 
and commercial use.201  This failure reveals that Nimmer’s test will be 
increasingly difficult to apply as product placement becomes more 
prevalent in our society.202 
D. Problems Applying Nimmer’s Test to Facenda 
Although it is easy to critique Nimmer’s framework by posing 
hypothetical entertainment works, a reexamination of the facts of 
Facenda also reveals the inadequacies of his framework considering 
that the Third Circuit could have come down on either side of the 
preemption dispute based on Nimmer’s framework.  The title 
“Making of Madden,” combined with the broadcast of the film 
directly before the release of the videogame, makes it difficult  
to deny the commercial purpose of the NFL’s film.203  The Third 
Circuit agreed, calling it an “infomercial.”204  However, the Third 
Circuit admitted that the film was not equivalent to a traditional 
commercial.205  A viewer could have looked to the length, 
information, and creative choices in the film to conclude that the 
film was similar to an artistic documentary or a “Docu-drama.”206  
Nimmer concedes that had the court accepted defendant’s 
characterization of that 22-minute film as a documentary, it would 
have accorded the work protection and denied the publicity claim. 207 
Similarly, the Third Circuit might have seen the film’s commentary 
from coaches and the game’s producers as descriptive and 
informative.  Under this perspective, the film could be likened to a 
                                        
 201. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(13) 
(recognizing that some cases would straddle the commercial and entertainment 
dichotomy, but concluding that these cases would be an exception to the general 
framework). 
 202. See Laura Petrecca, Product Placement—You Can’t Escape It, USA TODAY, Oct. 
11, 2006, at 1B–2B ( “It’s advertising ad nauseam.  And it’s getting worse. . . . [T]his 
year, marketers will spend a record $175 billion on ads in major media, such as TV, 
radio, print, outdoor, movie theaters and the Internet . . . [u]p 5% over 2005.”). 
 203. See Facenda v. NFL Films, 542 F.3d 1007, 1011–17 (3d. Cir 2008) (recounting 
that the NFL created the film just prior to the release of the videogame, and that the 
film had commentary from both the game’s creators and players from the NFL). 
 204. See id. at 1017 (agreeing with the plaintiff’s assertion that the film is similar to 
a “late night, half-hour-long ‘infomercial’”). 
 205. See id. (explaining that this infomercial “presents a novel issue, because the 
program is not a traditional 30- or 60-second television advertisement”). 
 206. See Davis v. Costa-Gavras, 654 F. Supp. 653, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (explaining 
that a “Docu-drama” is an art form entailing the “dramatization of an historical event 
or lives of real people,” and it “partakes of author’s license—it is a creative 
interpretation of reality”). 
 207. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][ii], at 1-88.2(13). 
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movie editorial, such as the one in Hoffman v. Capital Cities,208 where 
the editorial nature of the copyrighted article about the film Tootsie 
preempted Dustin Hoffman’s opposing right of publicity claim.209  
However, the Third Circuit deferred to the district court’s description 
of the film as an infomercial,210 and because Facenda’s contract did 
not agree to such uses of his voice, the NFL could not defeat 
litigation when it produced a derivative work based on the films.211 
The issue is not that the Third Circuit was right or wrong, but 
rather that the court could have easily come out on either side of the 
debate using Nimmer’s framework.212  Thus, this Comment adopts the 
same critique of Nimmer’s test that he makes of other preemption 
frameworks:  “[t]here has to be a better way.”213  This better solution 
requires looking beyond the paradigm of copyright law and 
proposing a new test that adequately details how courts can 
consistently determine when a state or federal infringement claim 
should prevail. 
III. RECOMMENDING A MODIFIED PREEMPTION FRAMEWORK THAT 
DRAWS UPON TRADEMARK JURISPRUDENCE 
To promote the goals of uniformity, clarity, and protection for 
original expression, a preemption test should allow celebrities and 
copyright holders to predict whether a derivative work is likely to 
receive the full extent of federal copyright protection.214  Only if such 
parties can predetermine if their investments in future works are 
going to prove worthwhile,215 rather than fail in litigation, will the 
                                        
 208. 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 209. See id. at 1189 (holding that Dustin Hoffman could not prevent the release of 
a periodical—containing mostly editorial commentary—related to the movie Tootsie 
merely because it contained a digitized image of Hoffman as Tootsie that the actor 
did not agree to in his movie contract). 
 210. See Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1017 (listing various factors that made the program 
appear like an infomercial). 
 211. See id. at 1012 (explaining that Facenda’s written contract with NFL Films 
explicitly stated that the NFL could use the video recordings of him “by whatever 
media or manner NFL Films . . . sees fit, provided, however, such use does not 
constitute an endorsement of any product or service”). 
 212. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 68, at 617 (explaining that the attempt to 
distinguish between commercial and non-commercial speech is not an easy task and 
often leads to inadequate First Amendment protection for speech with some 
commercial elements). 
 213. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(9). 
 214. See generally Kreiss, supra note 36, at 9 (explaining that copyright law seeks to 
provide a clear incentive system so that authors can be assured that they will be 
compensated for their efforts to produce new or derivative works). 
 215. See Bauer, supra note 13, at 6–11 (explaining how the copyright system is 
primarily based on financial incentives). 
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public continue to see the robust development of new creative 
works.216 
The recommended test helps fulfill these goals by providing 
specific factors that courts, celebrities, and copyright holders can 
apply to any potential use of an original or derivative copyrighted 
work.  By incorporating a concern for a public consumer’s response 
to a derivative work, this proposal will help all parties involved to 
determine whether a proposed use of derivative work is within the 
reasonable exercise of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights and 
within the reasonable expectations of the celebrity appearing in the 
original work. 
A. The Recommended Test Incorporates Trademark Law’s Concern for a 
Consumer’s Perspective 
This recommended solution asks one question:  is the derivative 
work so comparable to the original work that the copyright holder 
acted within the reasonable expectations of the celebrity?217  If the 
derivative work is similar to the original work in which the celebrity 
agreed to participate, then the celebrity should not be able to 
denounce the derivative work as an unauthorized exploitation of his 
name or likeness.218  In contrast, if the derivative work advances a 
substantially different form and message that the copyright holder 
should know the celebrity could not anticipate, then the copyright 
holder should not be able to exploit the celebrity through such a 
derivative work.219 
In determining the potential for unreasonable commercial 
exploitation of an artist, courts should not only make their own 
                                        
 216. See supra Part II.B.1 (noting that public benefit and public access to artistic 
works are the goals of the federal copyright system and the U.S. Constitution). 
 217. See generally 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][II],  
at 1-88.2(16)–(20) (agreeing that it is critical that a proposal for a preemption test 
should ensure that the derivative use of the celebrity’s identity is similar to the 
original use).  Thus, this proposed test, like Nimmer’s test, seeks to protect  
the interests and expectations of the celebrity.  Id. at § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I],  
at 1-88.2(9)–(16). 
 218. Cf. id. at § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][II], at 1-88.7(17)–(20) (agreeing that it is 
reasonable that a copyright owner should be able to produce derivative works that 
are the type of work that the celebrity originally contracted to produce in the first 
place).  Nimmer uses this rationale to explain why an actor who agreed to participate 
in a film should not be able to sue under a right of publicity claim when the very 
same film is broadcasted on television.  Id. 
 219. See generally Chadwick & Vatanparast, supra note 64, at 6 (arguing that in 
order to establish a predictable preemption solution, a copyright claim should 
preempt a right of publicity claim, except in cases where the use goes beyond the 
mere right to distribute, perform, or display a copyrighted work). 
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determination of physical similarity between the works, but also 
consider a consumer’s overall reaction to the works.220  This addition 
of a consumer focus is in line with copyright law’s concern for the 
public interest and the right of publicity’s presumption that the 
viewer perceives some aspect of the celebrity.221  Trademark 
jurisprudence’s test for the likelihood of confusion between two 
marks provides several specific factors that courts use to determine if 
viewers would perceive a substantial similarity between the original 
and derivative works.222  Courts usually apply this trademark test to 
goods; nevertheless, it is possible to modify the test to compare 
copyrighted works.223  The incorporation of elements from one area 
of the law to another is not uncommon.224  Thus, it is not surprising 
that trademark jurisprudence may assist copyright law. 
                                        
 220. See Standard Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 252 F.2d 65, 74 (10th Cir. 1958) 
(articulating that a trademark can confuse a consumer not only through visual 
similarity but also when “it conveys the same idea, or stimulates the same mental 
reaction, or has the same meaning”). 
 221. See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(explaining that the foundation of Bette Midler’s claim lay in the fact that a listener 
would associate the defendant’s song with the persona of Midler, even though it was 
not her voice). 
 222. J. Thomas McCarthy notes that: 
Similarity is not limited to the eye or ear.  The mental impact of a similarity 
in meaning may be so pervasive as to outweigh any visual or phonetic 
differences.  That is, the ‘psychological imagery evoked by the respective 
marks’ may overpower the respective similarities or differences in 
appearance and sound. 
4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION,  
§ 23:26, at 23–139 (4th ed. 2009) (quoting Vornado, Inc. v. Breuer Elec. Mfg. Co., 
390 F.2d 724, 156 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (Smith, J., dissenting)).  The Ninth Circuit listed 
the following factors for trademark infringement guidance: 
the similarity of the conflicting designations; relatedness or proximity of the 
two . . . products or services; strength of [plaintiff’s] mark; the marketing 
channels used; degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers in 
selecting goods; [defendant’s] intent in selecting its mark; evidence of actual 
confusion; and likelihood of expansion in product lines. 
Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entmn’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1053  
(9th Cir. 1999). 
 223. Cf. Kellogg v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 114 (1938) (holding that two 
shredded wheat cartons were not inappropriately similar because the competitor’s 
carton contained three more biscuits than the plaintiff’s, the competitor’s cartons 
did not resemble the plaintiff’s cartons in “size, form, or color,” the labels were 
strikingly different, and the competitor’s biscuit was about “two-thirds the size of the 
plaintiff’s” biscuit). 
 224. See, e.g., 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 222, § 6:14, at 6–33 (clarifying that copyright 
and trademark law “may overlap to give protection to different aspects of a single 
item.  For example, a picture of a person or character is copyrightable as a pictorial 
work and may also be used as a mark to identify the source of goods or services.”); 
Note, Computer Programs and Proposed Revisions of the Patent and Copyright Law,  
81 HARV. L. REV. 1541, 1552–54 (1968) (explaining that a computer program that is 
copyrightable may also be patentable, thus, both forms of law can be applied to the 
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To decide if the copyright holder acted within the reasonable 
expectations of the celebrity, courts should look to six factors—
adapted from the trademark test for confusion—to make an overall 
determination of similarity, as follows:  (1) the prominence of the 
celebrity in the original and derivative work, (2) the purpose of each 
work, (3) the sight, sound, and plot of the two works, (4) whether the 
two works were distributed through the same consumer marketing 
channels, (5) the degree of care that the copyright holder used in 
respecting the rights of the celebrity, and (6) the expanding use of 
the derivative work for purely commercial purposes.225  As in 
trademark law, not all of the factors will be relevant in every case, and 
the presence of one factor can make up for the lack of another.226 
 This trademark test can help solve the copyright-preemption 
dispute because it adds elements that focus on a consumer’s reaction 
to the works rather than relying solely on subjective judicial 
interpretation.  In trademark disputes, courts compare the similarity 
of two marks to determine whether the relevant consumer of a good 
is likely to confuse two goods because the branding, packaging, or 
symbols used to market the goods are too similar.227  The test’s focus 
on the similarity of the product and the mind of the relevant 
consumer228 is useful to the preemption debate in copyright law 
because it will allow courts to determine if an individual viewer is 
likely to find that the derivative work serves a similar purpose to the 
                                        
dispute).  But see Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 539 U.S. 23, 34 
(2003) (cautioning against “over-extension” of trademark law into the realm of 
copyright protection (quoting Trafix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 
23, 29 (2001))). 
 225. See Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1053 (listing the eight factors of the 
trademark test for confusion in order to assess the similarity of two goods).  Each of 
the factors for the proposed test nearly mirrors the factors as put forth in Brookfield, 
such as tangible similarity of the works and the market for distribution of the two 
works.  See id.  However, the terms “product” and “good” are replaced with this test 
for copyrighted work. 
 226. See Triumph Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Triumph Int’l Corp., 308 F.2d 196, 198  
(2d Cir. 1962) (explaining that the list for likelihood of confusion factors is not 
exhaustive and that “the court may have to take still other variables into account”). 
 227. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1053 (“The core element of trademark 
infringement is the likelihood of confusion, i.e., whether the similarity of the marks 
is likely to confuse customers about the source of the products.” (quoting Official 
Airlines Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1993))). 
 228. See, e.g., Beacon Mut. Ins. Co. v. OneBeacon Ins. Group, 376 F.3d 8, 10  
(1st Cir. 2004) (explaining that a likelihood of confusion claim in trademark law will 
only be actionable if the confusion  “exist[s] in the mind of a relevant person” 
(quoting Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 
1207 (1st Cir. 1983))). 
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original copyrighted work.229  Including the perspective of the 
relevant viewer is critical in this preemption issue because the 
celebrity should not be able to make a claim of commercial 
exploitation if the public viewer does not associate the celebrity with 
any commercial advertisement after exposure to the work.230 
B. The Recommended Framework Promotes the Interests of the Copyright 
Owners and Celebrities 
The proposed multi-factor test is more useful than Nimmer’s 
preemption test because it promotes the three primary goals related 
to copyright law.  First, it protects the unified copyright system 
because copyright owners will feel comfortable knowing that their 
derivative work will receive federal protection, so long as it is 
relatively similar to the original copyrighted work.231  Unlike 
Nimmer’s test, the recommended test does not involve choosing 
between terms of a contract and federal copyright protection.232  
Copyright owners would have specific factors to predetermine the 
reasonableness of the derivative work,233 allowing them to produce 
                                        
 229. See Rothman, supra note 15, at 253 (employing a similar focus on the 
consumer’s mind in her proposal for a preemption test when she suggests that  
“[i]f an image not only ‘reminds’ people of the right of publicity holder, but also 
‘looks like’ the right of publicity holder, then the defendant has taken the expression 
of the person’s identity, not merely the idea of that person”). 
 230. Cf. Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1143–46 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(opining that Sony used Laws’s song as a sample in another song, and this use was 
unlikely to be seen as an advertisement for any product); Hoffman v. Capital 
Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184–86 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a picture of 
Hoffman appearing in the magazine about the film Tootsie was akin to an expressive 
editorial, and Hoffman’s picture was not used for commercial advertisement or 
exploitation). 
 231. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (providing an exclusive right to control the use of 
derivative works); see also Kreiss, supra note 36, at 14 (explaining that copyright is 
about making money, and copyright owners must be assured that their derivative 
works will receive federal copyright protection).  The proposed test directly 
compares the tangible similarities between the original and the derivative works, an 
assessment that any author or copyright owner could make prior to using a 
celebrity’s identity in a derivative work, rather than relying on a judicial 
interpretation of the commercial/entertainment use of a work.  See supra text 
accompanying note 225 (proposing a six factor test for determining similarity 
between two copyrighted works). 
 232. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][II], at 1-88.2(12) 
(arguing that if the artist’s contract did not explicitly agree to a commercial 
advertisement, the copyright owner should not be able to exercise the exclusive right 
to produce a derivative work that might have an additional advertising purpose). 
 233. See supra Part III.A (listing the proposed factors for assessing the similarity 
between two copyrighted works based on the “likelihood of confusion” test in 
trademark law). 
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additional works without fear of subjective interpretations of 
copyright conflict preemption.234 
Second, the proposed test does not leave courts or copyright 
owners with the impossible task of distinguishing between 
commercial and entertainment expression.235  This test does not 
punish works merely because they are commercial; rather, it provides 
proper protection for commercial works, as required by the First 
Amendment.236  The test also provides copyright owners with a clear 
standard to evaluate whether their works will receive protection based 
on objective comparisons of the original and derivative works, not on 
subjective guesses between protected expression and commercial 
exploitation.237 
Finally, the recommended test promotes the interests of the state 
and federal legislatures by not precluding a celebrity from succeeding 
in a right of publicity claim.238  It allows a celebrity to overcome a 
competing copyright claim where the derivative work or the use of 
the work was unreasonably dissimilar to the original copyrighted 
work.239  This scenario promotes the interests behind the right of 
publicity laws, including the prevention of unjust enrichment and 
                                        
 234. Compare Rothman, supra note 15, at 235 (explaining that when dealing with 
copyright preemption issues some courts look to the deleted language of section 301 
for guidance in preemption, while others turn to different areas of copyright law for 
assistance), with 1 WILLIAM E. LEVIN, TRADE DRESS PROTECTION § 7:2 (2d ed. 2009) 
(explaining that even though slight variances exist across courts when applying the 
likelihood of confusion factors to individual cases, the majority of courts still rely on 
the same list of factors, and multiple circuit courts have explicitly discussed the 
importance of applying the likelihood of confusion test in a consistent manner). 
 235. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 68, at 616–17 (explaining that drawing the line 
between commercial and non-commercial expression “is not that simple” and may 
lead to under-protection of free speech). 
 236. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 
2001) (emphasizing that commercial speech receives “a measure of First 
Amendment protection”); see also Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entmn’t 
Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1053 (9th Cir. 1999) (comparing the marketing channels in 
the likelihood of confusion test).  Looking to an evaluation of marketing channels in 
both the trademark test and the modified test for copyright law reveals that the 
proposed test would not preclude a copyright claim merely because the work might 
be used to market goods or services to consumers. 
 237. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(12) 
(admitting that it is not always easy to draw a line between commercial and 
entertainment uses of a work). 
 238. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (noting 
the importance of the right of publicity claim because the failure to protect such a 
claim may result in unjust enrichment). 
 239. Compare supra Part III.B (asserting that the right of publicity should not be 
preempted if the derivative work seeks to promote an entirely different product or 
access an entirely unrelated market), with 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4,  
§ 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.2(12) (agreeing that an artist should not be associated 
with a commercial advertisement that was not in his original contract). 
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commercial exploitation of celebrities.240  However, this test also 
recognizes the deference that a preemption solution should pay to a 
competing federal copyright claim, based upon the Supremacy 
Clause of the Constitution and the inclusion of the Copyright Act’s 
preemption clause.241  If the author did not create the derivative work 
in bad faith and the work is reasonably similar to the original work, 
the recommended test favors the copyright claim.242  Ultimately, the 
federal interest in a uniform system to incentivize new creative works 
would dominate; however, a celebrity’s right of publicity claim can 
triumph in a case of clear commercial exploitation.243 
While there are several advantages to the recommended test, there 
remains some potential for conflicting outcomes in preemption 
disputes.  The multiple factors in the test provide courts with detailed 
guidance in deciding the case; however, various jurisdictions might 
choose to emphasize different factors, which may lead to inconsistent 
application of the test.244  Moreover, any multi-factor test runs the risk 
of becoming overly complex and tedious during litigation.245  Finally, 
one could argue that, while Nimmer’s test gives courts the authority 
to decide subjectively between a commercial and entertainment work, 
the proposed test still allows a court to speculate how a consumer 
would respond to the works.246  Despite these potential drawbacks, the 
proposed test provides substantially more direction for courts and 
                                        
 240. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 565 (noting that the purpose of the right of publicity 
is to prevent unjust enrichment by using a celebrity’s work in a way that denies the 
celebrity the ability to reap commercial benefit). 
 241. See supra Part I.A.2–3 (discussing the role of the Supremacy Clause in 
copyright jurisprudence, and the inclusion of section 301 to ensure that a state law 
does not conflict with federal copyright law). 
 242. See supra III.A (arguing that the degree of care the copyright holder uses in 
respecting the rights of the celebrity is an important factor in assessing similarity). 
 243. Cf. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 565 (providing an example of clear commercial 
exploitation). 
 244. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark 
Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1587, 1622–47 (2006) (arguing that there 
continues to be a strong disparity across jurisdictions concerning how to apply the 
multi-factor trademark test and explaining the discrepancy in interpretations of each 
factor in the likelihood of confusion test). 
 245. See William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49,  
66–69 (2008) (arguing that the problem with the likelihood of confusion test is that 
the test itself is vague, and its application is time-consuming due to the “fact-intensive 
nature” of the test). 
 246. See id. at 73–74 (arguing that the likelihood of confusion test is inappropriate 
because it allows courts to arbitrarily give weight to multiple factors, none of which 
gives appropriate consideration for expressive speech protected by the First 
Amendment). 
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more adequately promotes the incentive system in copyright law than 
Nimmer’s framework. 
C. Application of Recommended Test to Copyright-Preemption Disputes 
Facenda provides an apt example of how the recommended test 
could have helped the NFL determine the reasonableness of its 
derivative use of Facenda’s voice.  First, Facenda’s voice was very 
prominent in the original work, and thus Facenda had a strong 
interest in the future use of such copyrighted films.247  Second, the 
original film and the derivative videogame film did not have a similar 
purpose, as the former focused only on NFL football games, while the 
latter related to a consumer product.248  Third, the sound and visual 
appearance of the two works were distinct:  the original focused on 
NFL players and coaches, while the derivative work featured long 
segments with the game’s creators.249  Fourth, the marketing channels 
were similar because both works targeted football fans.250  The fifth 
and sixth factors relating to bad faith are not clear in this case.251  
Finally, the expansion of the NFL’s sound recordings from pure 
entertainment to a commercial purpose was evident because the 
derivative use of the segments related to a consumer product.252  With 
five out of seven factors showing a stark difference between the two 
works, it is not surprising that the Third Circuit upheld Facenda’s 
right of publicity claim.253 
In contrast to Facenda, the proposed test would not allow a right of 
publicity claim to preempt a copyright claim where both works take 
on a similar form and target viewers in a similar manner.254  Nimmer 
analyzes Laws v. Sony Music Entertainment, Inc.,255 where Sony used a 
                                        
 247. See Facenda v. NFL Films, 542 F.3d 1007, 1011 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing how 
the NFL described Facenda’s voice in the original films as “distinctive, recognizable 
[and] legendary” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 248. Id. at 1012. 
 249. See id. (noting that the program described the realism of the video game). 
 250. Id. 
 251. See id. (mentioning that the NFL might have originally referred to the film as 
the “Madden Promo” during production, but then denied that the film was a 
promotion in their testimonies). 
 252. See id. (explaining that in 2005 the NFL decided to create the “Making of 
Madden NFL 06” film, while Facenda’s original films related solely to NFL 
documentaries and not promotional videos). 
 253. Id. at 1033 (noting that the Pennsylvania right of publicity statute does not 
conflict with federal copyright by protecting Facenda’s voice). 
 254. See supra Part III.A (noting the importance of the consumer’s perspective in 
determining if a work is unreasonably commercially exploitive). 
 255. 448 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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sample from Debra Laws’s sound recording in the background of a 
Jennifer Lopez song.256  Both of Lopez’s and Laws’s works were voice 
recordings released on albums, and Sony owned valid copyrights in 
both works.257  Nimmer argues that Laws’s claim should be preempted 
because the Lopez song is not commercial.258  Under the proposed 
test, the copyright claim also preempts Laws’s claim; however, it is not 
necessary for a court to consider if the song has a commercial 
purpose.  It is enough that both the derivative work and the original 
were songs released on albums to the general music consumer.259  
Laws agreed to sing for a song, and Sony simply exerted its right to 
use that voice recording in a song.260 
Finally, in Wendt v. Host International, Inc.,261 Nimmer explains that a 
celebrity’s right of publicity claim should not be preempted where an 
anamatronic figure of a Cheers television character, Norm, was used 
for the commercial purpose of luring customers into an airport 
restaurant.262  In contrast to Nimmer’s conclusion, under the 
proposed test the right of publicity would be preempted because the 
copyright owner was merely exercising the right to create  
derivative works based upon the copyrighted Cheers character.   
The anamatronic figure was visually similar to the original 
copyrighted character, and was marketed at fans of the copyrighted 
show Cheers.  The allure of the figurine depended upon its association 
with the copyrighted character Norm, not with the exploitation of the 
personality of the actor, Wendt.  As such, the anamatronic derivative 
work was reasonably similar to the copyrighted work, and the actor 
should reasonably expect that the copyright might give rise to such 
derivative works. 
                                        
 256. Id. at 1136. 
 257. Id. 
 258. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][II], at 1-88.2(16)–
(20) (explaining that, because the use of the copyrighted sound recording in 
Lopez’s song constituted an expressive use, the copyright claim would not be 
preempted by Laws’s right of publicity). 
 259. See supra Part III.A (explaining that the proposed test focuses on the 
similarity of the product and the mind of the relevant consumer rather than the 
commercial use of the work). 
 260. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][II], at 1-88.2(16)–
(20). 
 261. 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 262. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I], at 1-88.1, 1-
88.2(9)–(15) (explaining that the use of the Cheers animatronic figures, which 
resembled the image of Wendt, were used solely for “commercial exploitation” in 
order to attract customers into a restaurant). 
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The recommended test provides a clearer standard to determine 
whether a copyrighted work will preempt a state right of publicity.  
Where Nimmer’s test fails to promote the general goals relating to 
creative copyrighted works, this test protects original expression, so 
long as the derivative use is similar to the original use of the 
celebrity’s persona.263  The recommended test methodically264 allows 
copyright owners to determine if a court is likely to recognize the 
derivative creation as part of the exclusive right to prepare derivative 
works in the Copyright Act.265  Thus, the test promotes the production 
of creative works, while recognizing celebrities’ right to limit the 
unfair exploitation of their identities. 
CONCLUSION 
Although Nimmer’s preemption framework might be alluring to 
courts struggling to find clarity in the copyright-preemption debate, 
courts should resist the temptation to adopt his framework.  
Nimmer’s call for courts to decide when a copyright should preempt 
a competing right of publicity—based on a subjective judicial 
determination of what constitutes a commercial use and an 
expressive use—undermines the goals of the Copyright Act, the First 
Amendment, and the Constitution. 
Instead, courts should determine preemption cases based on the 
reasonable expectations of copyright owners and celebrities. This 
determination requires considering the similarity between the 
original and derivative use and incorporating a consumer’s reaction 
to the works.  The recommended test, adopted from trademark law, 
provides a clearer standard to determine whether a copyrighted work 
will trump a state right of publicity.  The test provides a six-prong 
approach that protects artistic expression, so long as it is not 
exploitative.  It also reduces the need for subjective judicial 
interpretations of works and offers tangible factors that copyright 
owners might consider before investing the time and money to 
produce a derivative work.  While the increased presence of Bollinger 
champagne and Aston Martin cars in James Bond films might 
increase our inclination for expensive goods, the recommended test 
                                        
 263. See supra Part III.B (proposing a new test to balance the rights of celebrities 
against the right to create original works). 
 264. See id. (listing six factors that copyright owners and courts can evaluate to 
determine if the original work is sufficiently similar to the derivative work). 
 265. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (providing copyright owners the exclusive right to 
create and control the use of derivative works). 
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ensures that it will not suppress our access to future Bond-related 
films and products. 
